Mechanism Design for the Environment
AbstractWe argue that when externalities such as pollution are nonexcludable, agents must be compelled to participate in a "mechanism" to ensure a Pareto-efficient outcome. We survey some of the main findings of the mechanism-design (implementation-theory) literature -- such as the Nash implementation theorem, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, and the Arrow/d'Aspremont-Gerard-Varet mechanism -- and consider their implications for the environment, in particular the reduction of aggregate emissions of pollution. We consider the cases of both complete and incomplete information.
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Date of creation: 20 Feb 2003
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- Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
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