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Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint

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  • Paula Jaramillo
  • Çagatay Kayi
  • Flip Klijn

Abstract

We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 610.

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Date of creation: Feb 2012
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Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:610

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Keywords: fairness; strategy-proofness; indivisible good; land restitution;

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  1. Nisan,Noam & Roughgarden,Tim & Tardos,Eva & Vazirani,Vijay V. (ed.), 2007. "Algorithmic Game Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521872829.
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  3. Yves Sprumont, 2011. "Constrained-Optimal Strategy-Proof Assignment: Beyond the Groves Mechanisms," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ 14-2011, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  4. Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1977. "Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 427-38, March.
  5. Andersson, Tommy & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2008. "Non-manipulable assignment of individuals to positions revisited," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 350-354, November.
  6. Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 2009. "Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 227-245, August.
  7. Shinji Ohseto, 2006. "Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 111-121, September.
  8. Tommy Andersson & Lars Ehlers & Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 2012. "(Minimally) ?-Incentive Compatible Competitive Equilibria in Economies with Indivisibilities," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ 04-2012, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  9. Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 1983. "Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 939-54, July.
  10. Tadenuma Koichi & Thomson William, 1995. "Games of Fair Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 191-204, May.
  11. Andersson, T. & Svensson, L.-G. & Yang, Z., 2010. "Constrainedly fair job assignments under minimum wages," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 428-442, March.
  12. Sun, Ning & Yang, Zaifu, 2003. "A general strategy proof fair allocation mechanism," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 73-79, October.
  13. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, 03.
  14. Ning Sun & Zaifu Yang, 2003. "A General Strategy Proof Fair Allocation Mechanism," Working Papers, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics 346, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  15. Tommy Andersson & Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 2008. "Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 321-338, February.
  16. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
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Cited by:
  1. Andersson, Tommy & Ehlers, Lars & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2012. "Least Manipulable Envy-free Rules in Economies with Indivisibilities," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics 2012:8, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 30 Sep 2013.
  2. Arias María Alejandra & Ibáñez Ana María & Querubin Pablo, 2014. "The Desire to Return during Civil War: Evidence for Internally Displaced Populations in Colombia," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 209-233, January.
  3. Tommy Andersson & Lars Ehlers & Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 2012. "(Minimally) ?-Incentive Compatible Competitive Equilibria in Economies with Indivisibilities," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ 04-2012, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.

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