1. Rich McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000261, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2001. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 20 Jul 2005. [Downloadable!]
2. Michihiro Kandori, 2006. "Repeated Games, Entry in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-395, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
3. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2002. "Globalization and Cooperative Relations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3522, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ro’'i Zultan, 2008. "Altruism, Partner Choice, and Fixed-Cost Signalling," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002411, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ro'i Zultan, 2008. "Altruism, Partner Choice, and Fixed-Cost Signaling," Discussion Paper Series dp483, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Jul 2008. [Downloadable!]
   • Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ro'i Zultan, 2008. "Altruism, Partner Choice, and Fixed-Cost Signalling," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000002199, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
5. David G. Pearce, 1991. "Repeated Games: Cooperation and Rationality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 983, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
6. Dilip Abreu & Prajit K Dutta & Lones Smith, 1997. "Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Levine's Working Paper Archive 633, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Abreu, D. & Dutta, P.K. & Smith, L., 1992. "Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Working papers 92-15, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
7. Kalai, Ehud & Ledyard, John, 1997. "Repeated Implementation," Working Papers 1027, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Ehud Kalai & John O. Ledyard, 1997. "Repeated Implementation," Discussion Papers 1205, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
   • Kalai, Ehud & Ledyard, John O., 1998. "Repeated Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 308-317, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. David G. Pearce, 1987. "Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria: Collective Rationality and Intertemporal Cooperation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 855, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
9. Guilherme Carmona, 2003. "A Re-Interpretation of Nash Equilibrium Based on the Notion of Social Institutions," Game Theory and Information 0311005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
10. Stefania Ottone & Ferruccio Ponzano & Luca Zarri, 2008. "Moral Sentiments and Material Interests behind Altruistic Third-Party Punishment," Working Papers 48, Università di Verona, Dipartimento di Scienze economiche. [Downloadable!]
11. Mamoru Kaneko, 1981. "The Conventionally Stable Sets in Noncooperative Games with Limited Observations: Definitions and Introductory Arguments," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 601, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Kaneko, Mamoru, 1987. "The conventionally stable sets in noncooperative games with limited observations I: Definitions and introductory arguments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 93-128, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1991. "An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 607, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1989. "An Approximative Folk Theorem With Imperfect Private Information," Working papers 525, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1991. "An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 26-47, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. David Besanko & Ulrich Doraszelski & Yaroslav Kryukov & Mark Satterthwaite, 2008. "Learning-by-Doing, Organizational Forgetting, and Industry Dynamics," GSIA Working Papers 2009-E22, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business. [Downloadable!]
14. Roger B. Myerson, 1984. "An Introduction to Game Theory," Discussion Papers 623, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
15. Oystein Foros & Hans Jarle Kind & Jan Yngve Sand, 2008. "Slotting Allowances and Manufacturers’ Retail Sales Effort," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
16. Salomonsson, Marcus, 2009. "Group Selection: The quest for social preferences," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 712, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
17. Ehud Kalai & Alejandro Neme, 1989. "The Strength of a Little Perfection," Discussion Papers 858, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Kalai, E & Neme, A, 1992. "The Strength of a Little Perfection," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 335-55.
18. Ichiro Obara, 2005. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 365, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
19. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1983. "Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 219, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1983. "Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 251-268, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. JOHNSON, Paul & ROBERT, Jacques, 1999. "Collusion in a Model of Repeated Auctions," Cahiers de recherche 9909, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
21. Akihiko Matsui, 1988. "Information Leakage Forces Cooperation," Discussion Papers 786, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Matsui, Akihiko, 1989. "Information leakage forces cooperation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 94-115, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
22. Matthijs van Veelen, 2007. "Evolution of Strategies in Repeated Games with Discounting," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-115/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
23. Carmona, Guilherme, 2003. "A Re-Interpretation of the Concept of Nash Equilibrium Based on the Notion of Social Institutions," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp425, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia. [Downloadable!]
24. Chaim Fershtman & Ariel Pakes, 1999. "A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars," NBER Working Papers 6936, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Fershtman, C. & Pakes, A., 1998. "A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars," Papers 26-98, Tel Aviv.
    • Chaim Fershtman & Ariel Pakes, 2000. "A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(2), pages 207-236, Summer.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.