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What niche did human cooperativeness evolve in?

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  • Hannes Rusch

    (University of Giessen)

Abstract

The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is widely used to model social interaction between un- related individuals in the study of the evolution of cooperative behaviour in humans and other species. Many effective mechanisms and promotive scenarios have been studied which allow for small founding groups of cooperative individuals to prevail even when all social interaction is characterised as a PD. Here, a brief critical discusion of the role of the PD as the most prominent tool in cooperation research is presented, followed by two new objections to such an exclusive focus on PD-based models of social interaction. It is highlighted that only 2 of the 726 combinatorially possible strategically unique ordinal 2x2 games have the detrimental characteristics of a PD and that the frequency of PD-type games in a space of games with random payoffs does not exceed about 3.5%. Although these purely mathematical considerations do not compellingly imply that the relevance of PDs is overestimated, it is proposed that, in the absence of convergent empirical information about the ancestral human social niche, this finding can be interpreted in favour of a so far rather neglected answer to the question of how the founding groups of human cooperation themselves came to cooperate: Behavioural and/or psychological mechanisms which evolved for other, possibly more frequent, social interaction situations might have been applied to PD- type dilemmas only later. Human cooperative behaviour might thus partly have begun as a cooptation.

Suggested Citation

  • Hannes Rusch, 2013. "What niche did human cooperativeness evolve in?," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201327, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  • Handle: RePEc:mar:magkse:201327
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    File URL: https://www.uni-marburg.de/en/fb02/research-groups/economics/macroeconomics/research/magks-joint-discussion-papers-in-economics/papers/2013-papers/27-2013_rusch.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    4. Hisashi Ohtsuki & Christoph Hauert & Erez Lieberman & Martin A. Nowak, 2006. "A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks," Nature, Nature, vol. 441(7092), pages 502-505, May.
    5. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2003. "The nature of human altruism," Nature, Nature, vol. 425(6960), pages 785-791, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bryan Randolph Bruns, 2015. "Names for Games: Locating 2 × 2 Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(4), pages 1-26, October.
    2. Hannes Rusch, 2015. "Ancestral kinship patterns substantially reduce the negative effect of increasing group size on incentives for public goods provision," Working Paper Series in Economics 82, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
    3. Rusch, Hannes, 2018. "Ancestral kinship patterns substantially reduce the negative effect of increasing group size on incentives for public goods provision," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 105-115.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    cooperation; prisoner’s dilemma; cooptation; social niche; human evolution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other

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