1. Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2008. "The Simple Micro-Economics of Public-Private Partnerships," CEIS Research Paper 139, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 19 Dec 2008. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2008. "The Simple Micro-Economics of Public-Private Partnerships," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 08/199, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
2. Steven A. Matthews, 1991. "Renegotiation of Sales Contracts under Moral Hazard," Discussion Papers 950, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
3. Dan Anderberg & Carlo Perroni, 2003. "Time-Consistent Policy and Politics: Does Voting Matter When Individuals Are Identical?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
4. Michel Poitevin, 1995. "Contract Renegotiation and Organizational Design," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-03, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
5. Gonzalez, Patrick, 2002. "Investment and Screening under Asymmetric Endogenous Information," Cahiers de recherche 0201, GREEN. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • González, Patrick, 2002. "Investment and Screening under Asymmetric Endogenous Information," Cahiers de recherche 0204, Université Laval - Département d'économique. [Downloadable!]
   • Patrick Gonzàlez, 2004. "Investment and Screening Under Asymmetric Endogenous Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(3), pages 502-519, Autumn.
6. Gersbach, H. & Uhlig, H., 1998. "Debt contracts, collapse and regulation as competition phenomena," Discussion Paper 1, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Gersbach, Hans & Uhlig, Harald, 1997. "Debt Contracts, Collapse and Regulation as Competition Phenomena," CEPR Discussion Papers 1742, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Carstensen, Vivian, 2000. "Employment Stability via Annualized Hours Contracts," Diskussionspapiere der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Hannover dp-230, Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät. [Downloadable!]
8. Dirk Bergemann & Ulrich Hege, 2001. "The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1292, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Dirk Bergemann & Ulrich Hege, 2001. "The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1292R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Oct 2004. [Downloadable!]
   • Bergemann, Dirk & Hege, Ulrich, 2001. "The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping," CEPR Discussion Papers 2763, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Bergemann, D. & Hege, U., 2001. "The financing of innovation : learning and stopping," Discussion Paper 16, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
   • Dirk Bergemann & Ulrigh Hege, 2005. "The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(4), pages 719-752, Winter.
9. Jonathan Hamilton & Steven Slutsky, 2003. "Nonlinear Price Discrimination with a Finite Number of Consumers and Constrained Recontracting," Levine's Bibliography 234936000000000074, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Hamilton, Jonathan & Slutsky, Steven, 2004. "Nonlinear price discrimination with a finite number of consumers and constrained recontracting," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 737-757, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Gil, Ricard, 2006. "Renegotiation, Learning and Relational Contracting," CEI Working Paper Series 2005-14, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
11. Hofmann, Christian & Pfeiffer, Thomas, 2001. "Investitionsbudgetierung und Anreizprobleme: Ist der Groves-Mechanismus nur third-best? Zur Effizienz des Groves-Budgetierungsmechanismus," Diskussionspapiere der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Hannover dp-249, Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät. [Downloadable!]
12. Sharon Gifford, 2004. "To Make or Buy: An Allocation of Attention," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
13. Dutta, Sunil & Reichelstein, Stefan J., 2002. "Leading Indicator Variables, Performance Measurement and Long-Term versus Short-Term Contracts," Research Papers 1756, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
14. Dewatripont, Mathias & Legros, Patrick & Matthews, Steven A, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics," CEPR Discussion Papers 3487, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics," Penn CARESS Working Papers dfdfbbfe0a5b0e04217a58a93, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
    • Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 2003. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-006, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
    • Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 2003. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 890-930, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. S. Ho, 2008. "Extracting the information: espionage with double crossing," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 93(1), pages 31-58, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Schmitz, Patrick W, 2001. "The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," Bulletin of Economic Research, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(1), pages 1-17, January.
17. Antoine Martin & Cyril Monnet, 2000. "When should labor contracts be nominal?," Working Papers 603, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Antoine Martin & Cyril Monnet, 2001. "When should labor contracts be nominal?," Research Working Paper RWP 01-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. [Downloadable!]
18. Dan Anderberg & Carlo Perroni, . "Renegotiation of Social Contracts by Majority Rule," EPRU Working Paper Series 00-15, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Anderberg, D. & Perroni, C., 2000. "Renegotiation of Social Contracts by Majority Rule," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 566, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
19. Aaron S. Edlin & Benjamin E. Hermalin, 1997. "Contract Renegotiation in Agency Problems," NBER Working Papers 6086, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Aaron S. Edlin & Benjamin E. Hermalin, 1997. "Contract Renegotiation in Agency Problems," Microeconomics 9705002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
20. Cheng Wang, 2000. "Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts with Private Information," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(3), pages 396-422, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. Carstensen, Vivian, 1999. "Beschäftigungssicherung durch Arbeitszeitflexibilisierung," Diskussionspapiere der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Hannover dp-228, Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät. [Downloadable!]
22. Jens Robert Schöndube, 2007. "Early versus late effort in dynamic agencies with learning about productivity," FEMM Working Papers 07026, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management. [Downloadable!]
23. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse26_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5292, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 315-329, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
24. Kris de Jaegher, 2007. "Expert Incentives: Cure versus Prevention," Working Papers 07-08, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
25. Van den Steen, Eric, 2005. "Too Motivated?," Working papers 18180, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
26. Ching-mann Huang & Len-kuo Hu & Hsin-Hong Kang, 2005. "Compensation Design and Career Concerns of Fund Manager," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 379-397, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
27. Antoine Martin & Cyril Monnet, 2006. "Contracts and Money Revisited," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
28. Jonathan Hamilton & Steven Slutsky, 2003. "Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation with a Finite Population," Levine's Working Paper Archive 234936000000000079, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Hamilton, Jonathan & Slutsky, Steven, 2007. "Optimal nonlinear income taxation with a finite population," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 548-556, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
29. Alessia Isopi & Fabrizio Mattesini, 2008. "Aid and Corruption: Do Donors Use Development Assistance to Provide the “Right” Incentives?," CEIS Research Paper 121, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 14 Jul 2008. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Isopi Alessia & Mattesini Fabrizio, 2008. "Aid and Corruption: Do Donors Use Development Assistance to Provide the Right Incentives?," Departmental Working Papers 266, Tor Vergata University, CEIS. [Downloadable!]
30. Koch, Alexander K. & Peyrache, Eloic, 2004. "Mixed Up? That's Good for Motivation," IZA Discussion Papers 1331, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Alexander K. Koch & Eloic Peyrache, 2004. "Mixed up? That's good for motivation," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/22, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Sep 2004. [Downloadable!]
    • Alexander Koch & Eloïc Peyrache, 2008. "Mixed up? that’s good for motivation," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 107-125, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
31. Woerz, Julia, 1999. "Group Lending and Its Implications in Credit Markets for Poor People," Transition Economics Series 12, Institute for Advanced Studies. [Downloadable!]
32. Meirowitz, Adam & Sartori, Anne, 2006. "Secrecy and War: The Origins of Private Information," Papers 03-31-2006, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
33. F. Gul, 2000. "Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s10, Economics Department, Princeton University.
    Other versions:
    • Gul, Faruk, 2001. "Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 343-76, March.
34. Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1989. "Limited commitment and costly enforcement," Working Paper 90-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
35. Frank Gigler & Thomas Hemmer, 2008. "On the welfare effects of allowing unlimited renegotiation in agency relationships," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 243-265, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
36. Patrick González, 1999. "Specific Investment, Absence of Commitment and Observability," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-06, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Gonzalez, P., 1999. "Specific Investment, Absence of Commitment and Observability," Papers 99-03, Laval - Recherche en Energie.
    • González, Patrick, 1999. "Specific Investment, Absence of Commitment and Observability," Cahiers de recherche 9902, Université Laval - Département d'économique. [Downloadable!]
37. Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6725, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
38. Hector Chade & Edward Schlee, 2008. "Optimal Insurance with Adverse Selection," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002175, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
39. Steven Matthews, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics (joint with Mathias Dewatripont and Patrick Legros) Note the special time," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000095, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
40. Dirk Sliwka, 2001. "On the Use of Nonfinancial Performance Measures in Management Compensation," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse29_2001, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Dirk Sliwka, 2002. "On the Use of Nonfinancial Performance Measures in Management Compensation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(3), pages 487-511, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
41. Chong-en Bai & Yijang Wang, 1997. "Agency in Project Screening and Termination Decisions: Why is Good Money Thrown after Bad?," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 347., Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Chong-en Bai & Yijiang Wang, 1997. "Agency in Project Screening and Termination Decisions: Why Is Good Money Thrown After Bad?," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 43, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
42. Steven A. Matthews, 1993. "Renegotiation of Sales Contracts," Discussion Papers 1051, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Matthews, Steven A, 1995. "Renegotiation of Sales Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 567-89, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
43. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," MPRA Paper 12530, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
44. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2000. "Small Verifiability in Long-Term Relationships," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-98, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
45. Chong-en Bai & Yijiang Wang, 1995. "A Theory of the Soft-Budget Constraint," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 298., Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
46. Francesco Squintani, 1999. "Moral Hazard," Discussion Papers 1269, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
47. Marco Arnone & Umberto Giacometti, 2004. "Crescita, Innovazione Tecnologica e Mercato dei Capitali: il Ruolo del Venture Capital," Finance 0404008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]

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