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Contracts and Money

Author

Listed:
  • Jovanovic, B.
  • Ueda, M.

Abstract

We study the principal-agent problem when there is nominal risk. We find that when nominal data are gathered with delay, fully indexed contracts are not time consistent, not renegociation proof.

Suggested Citation

  • Jovanovic, B. & Ueda, M., 1996. "Contracts and Money," Working Papers 96-23, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:96-23
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    Cited by:

    1. Marvin Goodfriend & Robert G. King, 2001. "The Case for Price Stability," NBER Working Papers 8423, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Quadrini, Vincenzo & Meh, Césaire A. & Terajima, Yaz, 2015. "Limited Nominal Indexation of Optimal Financial Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 10330, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Hajime Tomura, 2021. "Nominal contracts and the payment system," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 72(2), pages 185-216, April.
    4. Jones, L.E. & Manuelli, R.E, 1997. "Policy Uncertainty and Informational Monopolies: The Case of Monetary Policy," Working papers 9715, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    5. Antoine Martin & Cyril Monnet, 2000. "When should labor contracts be nominal?," Working Papers 603, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    6. Young Sik Kim & Manjong Lee, 2011. "Unit of Account, Medium of Exchange, and Prices," Discussion Paper Series 1104, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
    7. Mukerji, Sujoy & Tallon, Jean-Marc, 2004. "Ambiguity aversion and the absence of wage indexation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 653-670, April.
    8. Yaz Terajima & Vincenzo Quadrini & Cesaire Meh, 2009. "Real Effects of Price Stability with Endogenous Nominal Indexation," 2009 Meeting Papers 847, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    9. Jovanovic, Boyan & Ueda, Masako, 1998. "Stock-Returns and Inflation in a Principal-Agent Economy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 223-247, September.
    10. L’Huillier, Jean-Paul & Zame, William R., 2022. "Optimally sticky prices: Foundations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    11. William (Bill) Zame & Jean-Paul L'Huillier, 2015. "Optimally Sticky Prices," 2015 Meeting Papers 621, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    12. Takuya Nakaizumi, 2016. "Hold-up Problem in Price Cap Regulation with Limited Ability of Commitment in High Inflation," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 55(4), pages 947-953.
    13. Hajime Tomura, 2019. "Imperfect Contract Enforcement and Nominal Liabilities," Working Papers 1905, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    14. Boyd, John H. & Levine, Ross & Smith, Bruce D., 2001. "The impact of inflation on financial sector performance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 221-248, April.
    15. Patrick Minford & Eric Nowell & Bruce Webb, 2003. "Nominal Contracting and Monetary Targets -- Drifting into Indexation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(484), pages 65-100, January.
    16. Kim, Young Sik & Lee, Manjong, 2017. "Money, unit of account, and nominal rigidity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 59-63.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    CONTRACTS; MONEY;

    JEL classification:

    • E30 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law

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