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Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: Contracting with non-exponential discounting

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  • Cetemen, Doruk
  • Feng, Felix Zhiyu
  • Urgun, Can

Abstract

This paper studies a continuous-time, finite-horizon contracting problem with renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency arising from non-exponential discounting. The problem is formulated as a dynamic game played among the agent, the principal and their respective future “selves”, each with their own discount function. We identify the principal optimal renegotiation-proof contract as a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) of the game, prove that such an MPE exists, and characterize the optimal contract via an extended Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman system. We solve the optimal contract in closed-form when discounting is a function of the time-difference only and demonstrate the applicability of the results in several different settings.

Suggested Citation

  • Cetemen, Doruk & Feng, Felix Zhiyu & Urgun, Can, 2023. "Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: Contracting with non-exponential discounting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:208:y:2023:i:c:s0022053123000029
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105606
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Continuous-time contracting; Dynamic inconsistency; Renegotiation; Extended HJB system; Non-atomic games;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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