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Crescita, Innovazione Tecnologica e Mercato dei Capitali: il Ruolo del Venture Capital

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Author Info

  • Marco Arnone

    (IMF & Catholic University of Milan)

  • Umberto Giacometti

    (Rothschild)

Abstract

Questo paper considera il venture capital come forma di finanziamento che si realizza in quegli ambienti dove i fallimenti di mercato causati da problemi informativi sono tali da non rendere possibile l'affermazione di altre istituzioni finanziarie, e dove questa si affermi come unica forma di finanziamento nell'ambito della finanza d'impresa. Definiremo allora il venture capital come un intermediario finanziario altamente specializzato in grado di operare in certi ambienti, caratterizzati da livelli elevati di incertezza e dalla presenza di forti asimmetrie informative, in cui la capacità nell'affrontare le inefficienza strutturali del mercato risiede nell'abilità di raccogliere e trattare le informazioni rilevanti per prendere decisioni ottimali di investimento. Gli ambienti in cui i venture capitalist sono prevalenti sono i settori innovativi delle imprese ad alta tecnologia, dove a causa dell'elevata intensità di ricerca e sviluppo e della sostanziale intangibilità dei beni, si generano considerevoli livelli di incertezza e di asimmetrie informative, rendendo estremamente difficoltosa la selezione delle opportunità di investimento e il controllo dei comportamenti opportunistici degli imprenditori.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/fin/papers/0404/0404008.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Finance with number 0404008.

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Length: 50 pages
Date of creation: 13 Apr 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpfi:0404008

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 50. Venture capital financing is essential in the presence of strong informational asymmetries that make more traditional forms of finance unavailable
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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

Related research

Keywords: Venture capital; asymmetric information; financing decision; ownership;

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References

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