This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Leading Indicator Variables, Performance Measurement, and Long-Term Versus Short-Term Contracts

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Sunil Dutta
Stefan Reichelstein

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In this article we develop a multiperiod agency model to study the role of leading indicator variables in managerial performance measures. In addition to the familiar moral hazard problem, the principal faces the task of motivating a manager to undertake "soft" investments. These investments are not directly contractible, but the principal can instead rely on leading indicator variables that provide a noisy forecast of the investment returns to be received in future periods. Our analysis relates the role of leading indicator variables to the duration of the manager's incentive contract. With short-term contracts, leading indicator variables are essential in mitigating a holdup problem resulting from the fact that investments are sunk at the end of the first period. With long-term contracts, leading indicator variables will be valuable if the manager's compensation schemes are not stationary over time. The leading indicator variables then become an instrument for matching the future investment return with the current investment expenditure. We identify conditions under which the optimal long-term contract induces larger investments and less reliance on the leading indicator variables as compared with short-term contracts. Under certain conditions, though, the principal does better with a sequence of one-period contracts than with a long-term contract. Copyright 2003 Institute of Professional Accounting, University of Chicago.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1046/j.1475-679X.2003.00125.x
File Format: text/html
File Function: link to full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Accounting Research.

Volume (Year): 41 (2003)
Issue (Month): 5 (December)
Pages: 837-866
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:bla:joares:v:41:y:2003:i:5:p:837-866

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0021-8456

Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0021-8456

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Dutta, Sunil & Reichelstein, Stefan J., 2004. "Stock Price, Earnings and Book Value in Managerial Performance Measures," Research Papers 1873, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
  2. Davila, Antonio & Peñalva, Fernando, 2004. "Corporate governance and the weighting of performance measures in CEO compensation," IESE Research Papers D/556, IESE Business School. [Downloadable!]
  3. Davila, Toni & Peñalva, Fernando, 2005. "Governance structure and the weighting of performance measures in CEO compensation," IESE Research Papers D/601, IESE Business School. [Downloadable!]
  4. Verbeeten, F.H.M., 2005. "New’ Performance Measures: Determinants of Their Use and Their Impact on Performance," Research Paper ERS-2005-054-F&A Revision, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus Uni. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? The most prolific authors have over 700 items listed on IDEAS.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-22.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.