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How do different performance measures affect managerial time orientation? Empirical evidence from sales managers in the oil and gas industry

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  • de Aguiar, Andson Braga
  • Pinheiro, Paulo Natal
  • Oyadomari, José Carlos Tiomatsu

Abstract

This study investigates the relative effect of performance measures on managerial time orientation. We collect survey data on the actual time allocation of sales managers for tasks that affect financial performance on the short-, medium-, and long-term horizons. In addition, we obtain survey data on the specific metrics used by an oil and gas firm and classify them into three groups: traditional accounting (gross margin and budgeted costs), nonfinancial (market share and sales volume), and accounting returns (economic value added — EVA). Based on partial least-squares analysis, our results suggest that, in our setting, both nonfinancial and accounting return measures can supplement traditional accounting metrics to mitigate potential short-term orientation by inducing sales managers to consider mainly not only sales tasks but also investing tasks, which will affect the firm results more than a quarter ahead. In addition, our results imply that accounting return metrics are not better than nonfinancial measures in inducing a longer-term orientation in our research setting.

Suggested Citation

  • de Aguiar, Andson Braga & Pinheiro, Paulo Natal & Oyadomari, José Carlos Tiomatsu, 2014. "How do different performance measures affect managerial time orientation? Empirical evidence from sales managers in the oil and gas industry," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 143-153.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:advacc:v:30:y:2014:i:1:p:143-153
    DOI: 10.1016/j.adiac.2014.03.001
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