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The influence of firm- and manager-specific characteristics on the structure of executive compensation

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  • Ryan, Harley Jr.
  • Wiggins, Roy III
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VFK-43DDWJC-1/2/760ec8cb62f03c0e172e5f9e58c4b376
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Corporate Finance.

    Volume (Year): 7 (2001)
    Issue (Month): 2 (June)
    Pages: 101-123

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:7:y:2001:i:2:p:101-123

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jcorpfin

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    References

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    1. DeFusco, Richard A & Johnson, Robert R & Zorn, Thomas S, 1990. " The Effect of Executive Stock Option Plans on Stockholders and Bondholders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(2), pages 617-27, June.
    2. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    3. David Hirshleifer, 1993. "Managerial Reputation and Corporate Investment Decisions," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 22(2), Summer.
    4. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-28, March.
    5. Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1992. "Does Executive Compensation Affect Investment?," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 5(2), pages 99-109.
    6. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    7. Baber, William R. & Janakiraman, Surya N. & Kang, Sok-Hyon, 1996. "Investment opportunities and the structure of executive compensation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 297-318, June.
    8. Steven Shavell, 1979. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 55-73, Spring.
    9. Gilson, Stuart C & Vetsuypens, Michael R, 1993. " CEO Compensation in Financially Distressed Firms: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(2), pages 425-58, June.
    10. Mehran, Hamid, 1995. "Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 163-184, June.
    11. Bryan, Stephen & Hwang, LeeSeok & Lilien, Steven, 2000. "CEO Stock-Based Compensation: An Empirical Analysis of Incentive-Intensity, Relative Mix, and Economic Determinants," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73(4), pages 661-93, October.
    12. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-77, December.
    13. Brickley, James A. & Coles, Jeffrey L. & Jarrell, Gregg, 1997. "Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 189-220, June.
    14. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-64, April.
    15. Smith, Clifford Jr. & Watts, Ross L., 1992. "The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 263-292, December.
    16. Narayanan, M P, 1985. "Observability and the Payback Criterion," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(3), pages 309-23, July.
    17. Richard A. Lambert, 1986. "Executive Effort and Selection of Risky Projects," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 77-88, Spring.
    18. Bhagat, Sanjai & Welch, Ivo, 1995. "Corporate research & development investments international comparisons," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2-3), pages 443-470, April.
    19. Yermack, David, 1995. "Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2-3), pages 237-269.
    20. Pisano, Gary P, 1989. "Using Equity Participation to Support Exchange: Evidence from the Biotechnology Industry," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 109-26, Spring.
    21. Pi, Lynn & Timme, Stephen G., 1993. "Corporate control and bank efficiency," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(2-3), pages 515-530, April.
    22. Gaver, Jennifer J. & Gaver, Kenneth M., 1993. "Additional evidence on the association between the investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 125-160, April.
    23. Jennifer J. Gaver & Kenneth M. Gaver, 1995. "Compensation Policy and the Investment Opportunity Set," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 24(1), Spring.
    24. Bizjak, John M. & Brickley, James A. & Coles, Jeffrey L., 1993. "Stock-based incentive compensation and investment behavior," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 349-372, April.
    25. Dechow, Patricia M. & Sloan, Richard G., 1991. "Executive incentives and the horizon problem : An empirical investigation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 51-89, March.
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    Cited by:
    1. Jian Cao & Indrarini Laksmana, 2010. "The effect of capital market pressures on the association between R&D spending and CEO option compensation," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 273-300, February.
    2. Nohel, Tom & Todd, Steven, 2005. "Compensation for managers with career concerns: the role of stock options in optimal contracts," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-2), pages 229-251, March.
    3. Andres, Christian & Fernau, Erik & Theissen, Erik, 2013. "Should I stay or should I go? Former CEOs as monitors," CFR Working Papers 12-02 [rev.], University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    4. Cheung, Yan-Leung & Stouraitis, Aris & Wong, Anita W.S., 2005. "Ownership concentration and executive compensation in closely held firms: Evidence from Hong Kong," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 511-532, September.
    5. Chang, Charles & Fuh, Cheng-Der & Hsu, Ya-Hui, 2008. "ESO compensation: The roles of default risk, employee sentiment, and insider information," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(5), pages 630-641, December.
    6. Anderson, Ronald C. & Bizjak, John M., 2003. "An empirical examination of the role of the CEO and the compensation committee in structuring executive pay," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(7), pages 1323-1348, July.
    7. Chourou, Lamia & Abaoub, Ezzeddine & Saadi, Samir, 2008. "The economic determinants of CEO stock option compensation," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 61-77, February.
    8. Meneghetti, Costanza, 2012. "Managerial Incentives and the Choice between Public and Bank Debt," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 65-91.
    9. Chen, Jing & Ezzamel, Mahmoud & Cai, Ziming, 2011. "Managerial power theory, tournament theory, and executive pay in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 1176-1199, September.
    10. Dlugos, Jennifer & Fahlenbrach, Rudiger & Gompers, Paul & Metrick, Andrew, 2005. "Large Blocks of Stock: Prevalence, Size, and Measurement," Working Paper Series 2005-9, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
    11. Uchida, Konari, 2006. "Determinants of stock option use by Japanese companies," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 251-269.
    12. Li, Donghui & Moshirian, Fariborz & Nguyen, Pascal & Tan, Liwen, 2007. "Corporate governance or globalization: What determines CEO compensation in China?," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 32-49, January.
    13. Morgan, Angela & Poulsen, Annette & Wolf, Jack, 2006. "The evolution of shareholder voting for executive compensation schemes," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 715-737, September.
    14. Rekker, Saphira A.C. & Benson, Karen L. & Faff, Robert W., 2014. "Corporate social responsibility and CEO compensation revisited: Do disaggregation, market stress, gender matter?," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 84-103.
    15. Chen, Yenn-Ru & Lee, Bong Soo, 2010. "A dynamic analysis of executive stock options: Determinants and consequences," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 88-103, February.
    16. Emilia Peni, 2014. "CEO and Chairperson characteristics and firm performance," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 185-205, February.
    17. Chaigneau, Pierre, 2013. "Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 4-23.
    18. Brockman, Paul & Yan, Xuemin (Sterling), 2009. "Block ownership and firm-specific information," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 308-316, February.
    19. Eahab Elsaid & Wallace Davidson & Xiaoxin Wang, 2011. "CEO successor compensation: outside versus inside successions," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 187-205, May.
    20. Yan-Leung Cheung & Aris Stouraitis & Anita Wong, 2003. "Ownership Concentation and Executive COmpenation in Closely Held Firms: Evidence from Hong Kong," Working Papers 142003, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
    21. Alves, Paulo & Couto, Eduardo & Francisco, Paulo, 2014. "Executive Pay And Performance In Portuguese Listed Companies," MPRA Paper 55189, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    22. Mahmoud Nourayi & Sudha Krishnan, 2006. "The impact of incentives on CEO compensation and firm performance," International Review of Economics, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 402-420, September.

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