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Moral hazard and renegotiation in multi-agent incentive contracts when each agent makes a renegotiation offer

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  • Osano, Hiroshi

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  • Osano, Hiroshi, 1998. "Moral hazard and renegotiation in multi-agent incentive contracts when each agent makes a renegotiation offer," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 207-230, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:37:y:1998:i:2:p:207-230
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    1. Arya Anil & Glover Jonathan, 1995. "A Simple Forecasting Mechanism for Moral Hazard Settings," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 507-521, August.
    2. Brusco, Sandro, 1997. "Implementing Action Profiles when Agents Collude," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 395-424, April.
    3. Ching-To Albert Ma, 1994. "Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 61(1), pages 109-129.
    4. Dilip Mookherjee, 1984. "Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 433-446.
    5. Demski, Joel S. & Sappington, David, 1984. "Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 152-171, June.
    6. Richard Arnott & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1988. "Randomization with Asymmetric Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 344-362, Autumn.
    7. Ching-To Ma, 1988. "Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 55(4), pages 555-572.
    8. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
    9. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1990. "Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(4), pages 597-625.
    10. HOLMSTROM, Bengt, 1979. "Moral hazard and observability," LIDAM Reprints CORE 379, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    11. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1992. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 1-42, January.
    12. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Common Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 923-942, July.
    13. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1279-1319, November.
    14. Esther Gal-Or, 1991. "A Common Agency with Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 274-286, Summer.
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    Cited by:

    1. Osano, Hiroshi & Kobayashi, Mami, 2005. "Double moral hazard and renegotiation," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(4), pages 345-364, December.
    2. Biancalani, Francesco & Gnecco, Giorgio & Riccaboni, Massimo, 2022. "Price-volume agreements: A one principal/two agents model," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 300(1), pages 296-309.
    3. Franck, Raphaël & Krausz, Miriam, 2008. "Why separate monetary policy from banking supervision?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 388-411, September.

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