Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Auszeichnungen: Ein Vernachlässigter Anreiz

Contents:

Author Info

  • Bruno S. Frey
  • Susanne Neckermann

Abstract

Laut ökonomischer Standardtheorie sollen Arbeitsanreize mittels Geldzahlungen vermittelt werden. Materielle Anreize in nicht-monetärer Form sind demgegenüber weniger effizient, sind aber dennoch weit verbreitet. Auszeichnungen in Form von Titeln, Orden, Medaillen und Ehrungen (Preisen) wurden bisher nicht beachtet. Es handelt sich dabei um extrinsische, nicht-materielle Anreize die ihre Wirkung über den Urtrieb der Individuen nach sozialer Anerkennung und Status entfalten. Wir analysieren wie sich monetäre Anreize und Auszeichnungen unterscheiden: Auszeichnungen sind in der Regel billig, begründen soziale Beziehungen, sind nicht direkt mit der Leistung verknüpft und verfügen über eine Signalwirkung. Darüber hinaus unterstützen Auszeichnungen die intrinsische Motivation, können die Wohlfahrt erhöhen und sind steuerfrei. Auszeichnungen sind ein wichtiges zusätzliches Instrument im Arsenal der Prinzipal-Agenten-Theorie. In vielen Kontexten wirken sie besser als Geld.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.iew.uzh.ch/wp/iewwp254.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich in its series IEW - Working Papers with number 254.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Oct 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:254

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Blümlisalpstrasse 10, CH-8006 Zürich
Phone: +41-1-634 22 05
Fax: +41-1-634 49 07
Email:
Web page: http://www.econ.uzh.ch/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Anreize; Motivation; nicht-monetäre Entlohnung; Auszeichnungen; Orden;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, 2005. "The Growth of Executive Pay," NBER Working Papers 11443, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Alois Stutzer, . "The Role of Income Aspirations in Individual Happiness," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich 124, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  3. Falk, Armin & Fehr, Ernst, 2002. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 3185, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Bruno S. Frey & Margit Osterloh, 2005. "Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats," CESifo Working Paper Series 1379, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Bénabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "Incentives and Prosocial Behavior," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 389, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Jan 2006.
  6. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
  7. Marco Becht & Patrick Bolton & Ailsa Röell, 2003. "Corporate governance and control," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/13330, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  8. Edward P. Lazear, 1996. "Performance Pay and Productivity," NBER Working Papers 5672, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Bohnet, Iris & Cooter, Robert, 2001. "Expressive Law: Framing or Equilibrium Selection?," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics qt5h6970h8, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
  10. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "A Theory of Social Interactions," NBER Working Papers 0042, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Frey, Bruno S & Jegen, Reto, 2001. " Motivation Crowding Theory," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(5), pages 589-611, December.
  12. Lindbeck, Assar, 1985. "The Prize in Economic Science in Memory of Alfred Nobel," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 23(1), pages 37-56, March.
  13. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2005. "Identity and the Economics of Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 9-32, Winter.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Bruno S. Frey, 2010. "Geld oder Anerkennung? Zur Ökonomik der Auszeichnungen," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 11(1), pages 1-15, 02.
  2. Gabriel M. Ahlfeldt, 2010. "Architektur, Ökonomie - Architekturökonomie," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 11(4), pages 340-355, November.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:254. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marita Kieser).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.