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Abstract

“Evaluitis” - i.e. ex post assessments of organizations and persons - has become a rapidly spreading disease. In addition to the well-known costs imposed on evaluees and evaluators, additional significant costs are commonly disregarded: incentives are distorted, ossification is induced and the decision approach is wrongly conceived. As a result, evaluations are used too often and too intensively. A viable and often superior alternative to evaluations is a careful selection of persons and afterwards leaving them to pursue their assigned tasks.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich in its series IEW - Working Papers with number 293.

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Date of creation: Jun 2006
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Handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:293

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Web page: http://www.ubscenter.uzh.ch/
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Related research

Keywords: Evaluation; Performance; Selection; Research; Incentives;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

• D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
• D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
• H43 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Project Evaluation; Social Discount Rate
• M40 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Accounting - - - General
• M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ACC-2006-07-21 (Accounting & Auditing)
• NEP-ALL-2006-07-21 (All new papers)
• NEP-CBE-2006-07-21 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)

References

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

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1. Fali Huang, 2007. "To Trust or to Monitor : A Dynamic Analysis," Labor Economics Working Papers 22444, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
   
   • Fali Huang, 2007. "To Trust or to Monitor: A Dynamic Analysis," Working Papers 11-2007, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
2. Timothy Besley, 2005. "Political Selection," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 43-60, Summer.
3. Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(3), pages 489-520, 07.
4. Cash, David & Clark, William, 2001. "From Science to Policy: Assessing the Assessment Process," Working Paper Series rwp01-045, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
5. Robert Gibbons, 1998. "Incentives in Organizations," NBER Working Papers 6695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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7. Frey, Bruno S & Jegen, Reto, 2001. " Motivation Crowding Theory," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(5), pages 589-611, December.
8. Schulze, Günther G. & Frank, Björn, 2000. "Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptility," Discussion Papers, Series 1 303, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.
   
   • Günther G. Schulze & Björn Frank, 2003. "Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptibility," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 143-160, 08.
   • Bjorn Frank & Guenther G. Schulze, 2000. "Deterrence versus Intrinsic Motivation: Experimental Evidence on the Determinants of Corruptibility," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0950, Econometric Society.
9. David N. Figlio & Lawrence S. Getzler, 2002. "Accountability , Ability and Disability: Gaming the System," NBER Working Papers 9307, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
10. Michael Bräuninger & Justus Haucap, 2003. "Reputation and Relevance of Economics Journals," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(2), pages 175-197, 05.
11. Iris Bohnet & Bruno S. Frey & Steffen Huck, . "More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding," IEW - Working Papers 052, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    
    • Huck, S & Bohnet, I & Frey, BS, 2001. "More order with less law: on contract enforcement, trust, and crowding," Open Access publications from University College London http://discovery.ucl.ac.u, University College London.
12. Bruno S. Frey & Margit Osterloh, 2005. "Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats," CESifo Working Paper Series 1379, CESifo Group Munich.
    
    • Bruno S. Frey & Margit Osterloh, 2004. "Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats," CREMA Working Paper Series 2005-03, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    • Bruno S. Frey & Margit Osterloh, . "Yes, Managers Should be Paid Like Bureaucrats," IEW - Working Papers 187, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
13. Tilman Brück & Andreas Stephan, 2005. "Do Eurozone Countries Cheat with Their Budget Deficit Forecasts?," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 508, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    
    • Tilman Brück & Andreas Stephan, 2006. "Do Eurozone Countries Cheat with their Budget Deficit Forecasts?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 3-15, 02.
    • Stephan, Andreas & Brück, Tilman, 2005. "Do Eurozone Countries Cheat with their Budget Deficit Forecasts?," Working Paper Series 2005,5, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), The Postgraduate Research Programme Capital Markets and Finance in the Enlarged Europe.
14. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(3), pages 489-520.
15. Robert Gibbons, 1998. "Incentives in Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 115-132, Fall.
16. Randall G. Holcombe, 2004. "The National Research Council Ranking of Research Universities: Its Impact on Research in Economics," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 1(3), pages 498-514, December.
17. William Starbuck, 2004. "Methodological Challenges Posed by Measures of Performance," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 337-343, October.
18. Ole Olesen & N. Petersen, 2003. "Introduction," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 237-241, November.

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