Do Eurozone Countries Cheat with Their Budget Deficit Forecasts?
AbstractWe estimate the political economy determinants of budget deficit forecast errors. Since the adoption of the Stability Pact, Eurozone governments have manipulated forecasts before elections. The political orientation and the institutional design of governments also affects the quality of forecasts.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its series Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin with number 508.
Length: 9 p.
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Fiscal policy; Budget deficit; Forecast error; Electoral cycles;
Other versions of this item:
- Tilman Brück & Andreas Stephan, 2006. "Do Eurozone Countries Cheat with their Budget Deficit Forecasts?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 3-15, 02.
- Stephan, Andreas & Brück, Tilman, 2005. "Do Eurozone Countries Cheat with their Budget Deficit Forecasts?," Working Paper Series 2005,5, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), The Postgraduate Research Programme Capital Markets and Finance in the Enlarged Europe.
- H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
- H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
- C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
- C53 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Forecasting and Prediction Models; Simulation Methods
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Beetsma, Roel & Jensen, Henrik, 2003. "Contingent deficit sanctions and moral hazard with a stability pact," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 187-208, October.
- von Hagen, Jürgen, 2003. "Fiscal discipline and growth in Euroland: Experiences with the stability and growth pact," ZEI Working Papers B 06-2003, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn.
- Rolf Strauch & Mark Hallerberg & Jürgen von Hagen, 2004.
"Budgetary Forecasts in Europe – The Track Record of Stability and Convergence Programmes,"
Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces
E2004/42, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
- Strauch, Rolf & Hallerberg, Mark & von Hagen, Jürgen, 2004. "Budgetary forecasts in Europe - the track record of stability and convergence programmes," Working Paper Series 0307, European Central Bank.
- Andrikopoulos, Andreas & Loizides, Ioannis & Prodromidis, Kyprianos, 2004. "Fiscal policy and political business cycles in the EU," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 125-152, March.
- Marco Buti & Paul van den Noord, 2004. "Fiscal policy in EMU: Rules, discretion and political incentives," European Economy - Economic Papers 206, Directorate General Economic and Monetary Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
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