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Regelgebundene versus diskretionäre Wirtschaftspolitik: das Beispiel des Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspaktes

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Author Info
Renate Ohr
André Schmidt

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Abstract

Der vorliegende Beitrag thematisiert den Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt unter Berücksichtigung von Zeitinkonsistenzproblemen. Die Verfasser gelangen zu dem Ergebnis, dass die bisherige Anwendungspraxis des Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspaktes nicht geeignet ist, die Zeitinkonsistenzprobleme zu reduzieren. Vom Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt wird nur dann eine disziplinierende Wirkung ausgehen, wenn dieser auch glaubwürdig umgesetzt wird. Daher betonen die Verfasser die Notwendigkeit einer stärkeren Regelbindung anstelle der in der bisherigen Anwendung bestehenden hohen diskretionären Ermessensspielräume.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its journal Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung.

Volume (Year): 73 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 381-391
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Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:73-30-5

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Robert Ackrill & Dean Garratt, . "Rules Versus Discretion: Why EMU Needs a Stability Pact," Discussion Papers in European Economics 97/3, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.
  2. Marco Buti & Gabriele Giudice, 2002. "Maastricht's Fiscal Rules at Ten: An Assessment," Journal of Common Market Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(5), pages 823-848, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Schelling, Thomas C, 1982. "Establishing Credibility: Strategic Considerations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 77-80, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Nordhaus, William D, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(2), pages 169-90, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1984. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Beetsma, Roel & Jensen, Henrik, 2003. "Contingent deficit sanctions and moral hazard with a stability pact," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 187-208, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1988. "Credibility and politics," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 542-550, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Renate Ohr & André Schmidt, 2006. "Handelbare Verschuldungsrechte zur Sicherung fiskalischer Stabilität in der Währungsunion?," Departmental Discussion Papers 128, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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