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The Institutional Foundations of Monetary Commitment: A Comparative Analysis

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  • Ball, R.
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VC6-3X64Y7T-6/2/9975b6cb6f084aec7250582fe2412458
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal World Development.

    Volume (Year): 27 (1999)
    Issue (Month): 10 (October)
    Pages: 1821-1842

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:27:y:1999:i:10:p:1821-1842

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev

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    1. Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-86, March.
    2. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1984. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Roubini, Nouriel & Sachs, Jeffrey D., 1989. "Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 903-933, May.
    4. Hill, Alice & Abdala, Manuel Angel & DEC, 1993. "Regulation, institutions, and commitment : privatization and regulation in the Argentine telecommunications sector," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1216, The World Bank.
    5. Thomas J. Sargent, 1981. "The ends of four big inflations," Working Papers 158, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    6. Mas, Ignacio, 1995. "Central bank independence: A critical view from a developing country perspective," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 23(10), pages 1639-1652, October.
    7. Levy, Brian & Spiller, Pablo T, 1994. "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 201-46, October.
    8. Mas, Ignacio, 1995. "Things Governments Do to Money: A Recent History of Currency Reform Schemes and Scams," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(4), pages 483-512.
    9. Nordhaus, William D, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 169-90, April.
    10. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May.
    11. Cukierman, Alex & Kiguel, Miguel A. & Liviatan, Nissan, 1992. "How much to commit to an exchange rate rule : balancing credibility and flexibility," Policy Research Working Paper Series 931, The World Bank.
    12. McCallum, Bennett T., 1996. "International Monetary Economics," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195094947, July.
    13. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
    14. Kenneth Rogoff, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," NBER Working Papers 2428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Mankiw, N. Gregory, 1987. "The optimal collection of seigniorage : Theory and evidence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 327-341, September.
    16. Jeffrey D. Sachs, 1989. "Social Conflict and Populist Policies in Latin America," NBER Working Papers 2897, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Kiguel, Miguel A. & Liviatan, Nissan, 1994. "Exchange-rate-based stabilization in Argentina and Chile : a fresh look," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1318, The World Bank.
    18. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
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