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Business Cycles, Political Incentives and the Macroeconomy: Comparison of Models

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Reichenvater, Arno

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Abstract

Politicians and political parties are faced with the problem of being elected into power, and later, of being re-elected. These political ambitions are often fuelled by policies that affect the entire economy and business cycles. The purpose of this paper is to compare the various models used to describe how political decision-making may affect business cycles. Both opportunistic and partisan models, and exchange rate manipulation are examined, and empirical evidence is used to view the validity of the models.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 5527.

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Date of creation: May 2007
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:5527

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Keywords: business cycles partisan models opportunistic models politics

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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  1. Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1988. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," NBER Working Papers 1838, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Francisco José Veiga & Linda Gonçalves Veiga, 2004. "Political Business Cycles at the Municipal Level," NIPE Working Papers 4/2004, NIPE - Universidade do Minho. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Nordhaus, William D, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(2), pages 169-90, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Carlsen, Fredrik, 1997. " Opinion Polls and Political Business Cycles: Theory and Evidence for the United States," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 92(3-4), pages 387-406, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Heckelman, Jac C, 2001. "The Econometrics of Rational Partisan Theory," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 33(3), pages 417-26, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Rudiger Dornbusch, 1987. "Exchange Rate Economics: 1986," NBER Working Papers 2071, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 651-78, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Carlsen, Fredrik, 1997. "Counterfiscal Policies and Partisan Politics: Evidence from Industrialized Countries," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 29(2), pages 145-51, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Alesina, Alberto, 1988. "Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 496-805, September.
  11. J. Bradford De Long, 1999. "Introduction to the Symposium on Business Cycles," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(2), pages 19-22, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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