Do Eurozone Countries Cheat with their Budget Deficit Forecasts?
AbstractThe authors assess the political economy determinants of budget deficit forecast errors. Their econometric analysis indicates that Eurozone governments have manipulated deficit forecasts before elections since the introduction of the Stability and Growth Pact. The left-right position and the institutional design of governments also affect the quality of deficit forecasts. Copyright 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd..
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Kyklos.
Volume (Year): 59 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (02)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0023-5962
Other versions of this item:
- Stephan, Andreas & Brück, Tilman, 2005. "Do Eurozone Countries Cheat with their Budget Deficit Forecasts?," Working Paper Series 2005,5, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), The Postgraduate Research Programme Capital Markets and Finance in the Enlarged Europe.
- Tilman Brück & Andreas Stephan, 2005. "Do Eurozone Countries Cheat with Their Budget Deficit Forecasts?," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 508, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
- H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
- C53 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Forecasting and Prediction Models; Simulation Methods
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Marco Buti & Paul van den Noord, 2004. "Fiscal policy in EMU: Rules, discretion and political incentives," European Economy - Economic Papers 206, Directorate General Economic and Monetary Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
- von Hagen, Jürgen, 2003. "Fiscal discipline and growth in Euroland: Experiences with the stability and growth pact," ZEI Working Papers B 06-2003, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn.
- Rolf Strauch & Mark Hallerberg & Jürgen von Hagen, 2004.
"Budgetary Forecasts in Europe – The Track Record of Stability and Convergence Programmes,"
Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces
E2004/42, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
- Strauch, Rolf & Hallerberg, Mark & von Hagen, Jürgen, 2004. "Budgetary forecasts in Europe - the track record of stability and convergence programmes," Working Paper Series 0307, European Central Bank.
- Beetsma, Roel & Jensen, Henrik, 2003. "Contingent deficit sanctions and moral hazard with a stability pact," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 187-208, October.
- Andrikopoulos, Andreas & Loizides, Ioannis & Prodromidis, Kyprianos, 2004. "Fiscal policy and political business cycles in the EU," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 125-152, March.
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