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Lobbying against Environmental Regulation vs. Lobbying for Loopholes

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Author Info
Andreas Polk
Armin Schmutzler () (Socioeconomic Institute, University of Zurich)

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Abstract

We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two firms engage in two types of lobbying against a restriction on allowed pollution: General lobbying increases the total amount of allowed pollution, which is beneficial for both firms. Private lobbying increases the individual pollution standard of the lobbying firm, but has a negative or zero effect on the allowed emissions of the competitor. We determine the lobbying equilibrium and discuss the resulting emission level. In many cases, a higher effectiveness of private lobbying is detrimental for firms and beneficial for environmental quality, as it induces firms to turn towards excessive amounts of relatively unproductive private lobbying.

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File URL: http://www.soi.uzh.ch/research/wp/2003/wp0301.pdf
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File Function: First version, 2003
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute in its series Working Papers with number 0301.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2003
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in European Journal of Political Economy 21, 2005, pages 915-931
Handle: RePEc:soz:wpaper:0301

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Related research
Keywords: environmental regulation; pollution standards; interest groups; lobbying; policy making;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Yves Schneider & Peter Zweifel, 2004. "How Much Internalization of Nuclear Risk Through Liability Insurance?," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 219-240, December. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Rainer Winkelmann, 2002. "Subjektive Daten in der empirischen Wirtschaftsforschung: Probleme und Perspektiven," Working Papers 0207, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, revised Jul 2002. [Downloadable!]
  3. Stefan Buehler & Armin Schmutzler & Men-Andri Benz, 2002. "Infrastructure Quality in Deregulated Industries: Is there an Underinvestment Problem?," Working Papers 0209, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Borek, Thomas & Bühler, Stefan & Schmutzler, Armin, 2003. "Weddings with Uncertain Prospects - Mergers under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 3839, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Polk, Andreas & Schmutzler, Armin, 2005. "Lobbying against environmental regulation vs. lobbying for loopholes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 915-931, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Zava Aydemir & Stefan Buehler, 2002. "Estimating Vertical Foreclosure in U.S. Gasoline Supply," Working Papers 0212, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Stefan Buehler & Justus Haucap, 2003. "Strategic Outsourcing Revisited," Working Papers 0305, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Michael Breuer, 2004. "Optimal Insurance Contracts without the Non-Negativity Constraint on Indemnities Revisited," Working Papers 0406, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute. [Downloadable!]
  3. Daniel Halbheer & Sarah Niggli & Armin Schmutzler, 2003. "What does it take to sell Environmental Policy? An empirical Analysis of Referendum Data," Working Papers 0304, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, revised Apr 2005. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Stefan Buehler & Justus Haucap, 2003. "Mobile Number Portability," Working Papers 0303, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, revised Jul 2003. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Hans Gersbach & Armin Schmutzler, 2004. "Globalization and General Worker Training," Working Papers 0403, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute. [Downloadable!]
  6. Harry Telser & Karolin Becker & Peter Zweifel, 2004. "Validity and Reliability of Willingness-to-Pay Estimates: Evidence from Two Overlapping Discrete-Choice Experiments," Working Papers 0412, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, revised Mar 2008. [Downloadable!]
  7. Andreas Polk & Armin Schmutzler, 2003. "Lobbying against Environmental Regulation vs. Lobbying for Loopholes," Working Papers 0301, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Harry Telser & Peter Zweifel, 2003. "Validity of Discrete-Choice Experiments - Evidence for Health Risk Reduction," Working Papers 0313, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, revised Feb 2005. [Downloadable!]
  9. Peter Zweifel & Harry Telser & Stephan Vaterlaus, 2005. "Consumer Resistance Against Regulation: The Case of Health Care," Working Papers 0505, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute. [Downloadable!]
  10. Peter Zweifel, 2005. "The Purpose and Limits of Social Health Insurance," Working Papers 0509, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, revised Sep 2005. [Downloadable!]
  11. Michael Breuer, 2003. "Multiple Losses, Ex-Ante Moral Hazard, and the Non-Optimality of the Standard Insurance Contract," Working Papers 0302, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, revised Apr 2003. [Downloadable!]
  12. Michael Breuer, 2004. "Deductible or Co-Insurance: Which is the Better Insurance Contract under Adverse Selection?," Working Papers 0401, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, revised Oct 2004. [Downloadable!]
  13. Stefan Boes & Rainer Winkelmann, 2005. "Ordered Response Models," Working Papers 0507, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Stefan Buehler & Armin Schmutzler, 2003. "Asymmetric Vertical Integration," Working Papers 0306, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, revised Nov 2004. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Stefan Buehler & Armin Schmutzler, 2005. "On The Role of Access Charges Under Network Competition," Working Papers 0501, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute. [Downloadable!]
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