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How Much Internalization of Nuclear Risk Through Liability Insurance?

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Author Info
Yves Schneider ()
Peter Zweifel ()

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Abstract

An important source of conflict surrounding nuclear energy is that with a very small probability, a large-scale nuclear accident may occur. One way to internalize the associated financial risks is through mandating nuclear operators to have liability insurance. This paper presents estimates of consumers' willingness to pay for increased financial security provided by an extension of coverage, based on the 'stated choice' approach. A Swiss citizen with median characteristics may be willing to pay 0.14 US cents per kwh to increase coverage beyond the current CHF 0.7 billion (bn.) (US$ 0.47 bn.). Marginal willingness to pay declines with higher coverage but exceeds marginal cost at least up to CHF 4 bn.(US$ 2.7 bn.). An extension of nuclear liability insurance coverage therefore may be efficiency-enhancing.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Risk and Uncertainty.

Volume (Year): 29 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
Pages: 219-240
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:29:y:2004:i:3:p:219-240

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100299

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  1. Harry Telser & Karolin Becker & Peter Zweifel, 2004. "Validity and Reliability of Willingness-to-Pay Estimates: Evidence from Two Overlapping Discrete-Choice Experiments," Working Papers 0412, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, revised Mar 2008. [Downloadable!]
  2. Andreas Polk & Armin Schmutzler, 2003. "Lobbying against Environmental Regulation vs. Lobbying for Loopholes," Working Papers 0301, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Stefan Buehler & Justus Haucap, 2003. "Strategic Outsourcing Revisited," Working Papers 0305, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Michael Breuer, 2004. "Optimal Insurance Contracts without the Non-Negativity Constraint on Indemnities Revisited," Working Papers 0406, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute. [Downloadable!]
  5. Harry Telser & Peter Zweifel, 2003. "Validity of Discrete-Choice Experiments - Evidence for Health Risk Reduction," Working Papers 0313, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, revised Feb 2005. [Downloadable!]
  6. Peter Zweifel & Harry Telser & Stephan Vaterlaus, 2005. "Consumer Resistance Against Regulation: The Case of Health Care," Working Papers 0505, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute. [Downloadable!]
  7. Michael Breuer, 2003. "Multiple Losses, Ex-Ante Moral Hazard, and the Non-Optimality of the Standard Insurance Contract," Working Papers 0302, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, revised Apr 2003. [Downloadable!]
  8. Simon Loertscher & Yves Schneider, 2005. "Switching Costs, Firm Size, and Market Structure," Working Papers 0508, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Michael Breuer, 2004. "Deductible or Co-Insurance: Which is the Better Insurance Contract under Adverse Selection?," Working Papers 0401, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, revised Oct 2004. [Downloadable!]
  10. Stefan Buehler & Justus Haucap, 2003. "Mobile Number Portability," Working Papers 0303, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, revised Jul 2003. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Hans Gersbach & Armin Schmutzler, 2004. "Globalization and General Worker Training," Working Papers 0403, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute. [Downloadable!]
  12. Stefan Boes & Rainer Winkelmann, 2005. "Ordered Response Models," Working Papers 0507, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Stefan Buehler & Armin Schmutzler, 2003. "Asymmetric Vertical Integration," Working Papers 0306, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, revised Nov 2004. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Stefan Buehler & Armin Schmutzler, 2005. "On The Role of Access Charges Under Network Competition," Working Papers 0501, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-7.

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