Mobile Number Portability
Abstract
This paper examines the consequences of introducing mobile number portability (MNP). As MNP allows consumers to keep their telephone number when switching providers, it reduces consumers' switching costs. However, MNP may also cause consumer ignorance if telephone numbers no longer identify networks. As a result, while fostering competition for mobile customers, MNP may also induce operators to increase termination charges for calls to mobile networks, generating ambiguous welfare effects. We examine how extensions such as MNP based on call-forwarding, termination fee regulation, and alternative means of carrier identification affect these findings.Download Info
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Paper provided by Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg in its series Working Paper with number 17/2003.Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ris:vhsuwp:2003_017
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Related research
Keywords: number portability; switching costs; telecommunications; network competition;Other versions of this item:
- Stefan Buehler & Justus Haucap, 2003. "Mobile Number Portability," Working Papers 0303, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, revised Jul 2003.
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
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"Calling party pays or receiving party pays? The diffusion of mobile telephony with endogenous regulation,"
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