We investigate how various institutional settings affect a network provider’s incentives to invest in infrastructure quality. Under reasonable assumptions on demand, investment incentives turn out to be smaller under vertical separation than under vertical integration, though we also provide counter-examples. The introduction of downstream competition for the market can sometimes improve incentives. With suitable non-linear access prices investment incentives under separation become identical to those under integration.
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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
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Stefan Buehler & Justus Haucap, 2003.
"Mobile Number Portability,"
Working Papers
0303, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, revised Jul 2003.
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Stefan Buehler & Armin Schmutzler, 2003.
"Asymmetric Vertical Integration,"
Working Papers
0306, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, revised Nov 2004.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: