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Competition and Access in Telecoms: ECPR, Global Price Cap, and Auctions


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  • Marcel Boyer



Many network industries (telecommunications, electricity, natural gas, postal services, water and sewage services, etc.) are confronted with significant logistic and behavioral problems in their transition towards competition. In this article, I first recall some general principes and fundamental facts and issues before proceeding with the basic procedures through which competition can be introduced in telecommunications markets, that is the access pricing rules. I compare the efficient component pricing rule, the Ramsay pricing rule, the global price cap rule, and show how the latter could in fact be an answer to many of the concerns and questions raised in the search for an efficient way to introduce competition in telecommunications markets. I then continue by presenting some recent research on network access auctions, a possible approach to increasing competition with soft or light-handed regulation. I then conclude by raising some neglected albeit important issues. Les industries-réseaux (télécommunications, électricité, gaz naturel, services postaux, services d'aqueduc et d'égouts, etc.) font face à de sérieux problèmes dans leur transition vers la concurrence. Dans cet article, je rappelle d'abord quelques faits et principes avant de discuter des procédures par lesquelles la concurrence peut être introduite, à savoir les règles et conditions d'accès aux réseaux. Je compare la règle de tarification efficace des composantes, la règle de Ramsey et la règle du plafonnement global des prix et je montre que cette dernière peut être la réponse à plusieurs questions soulevées dans la recherche d'une approche efficace à la transition vers la concurrence. Je poursuis avec la présentation d'un mécanisme d'enchère qui pourrait aussi permettre le développement ordonné de la concurrence. En conclusion, je rappelle divers facteurs généralement négligés0501s néanmoins importants.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 97s-03.

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Date of creation: 01 Jan 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:97s-03

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Keywords: Regulation; Competition; Telecommunications; Réglementation; concurrence; télécommunications;

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. John McMillan, 1994. "Selling Spectrum Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 145-162, Summer.
  2. Vickers, John, 1995. "Competition and Regulation in Vertically Related Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(1), pages 1-17, January.
  3. Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, 1995. "Access and Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient is the Efficient Component Pricing Rule?," Working Papers, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics 95-04, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  4. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1992. "Access Pricing and Competition," IDEI Working Papers 19, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  5. Cramton, Peter C, 1995. "Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(2), pages 267-343, Summer.
  6. Armstrong, Mark & Doyle, Chris & Vickers, John, 1996. "The Access Pricing Problem: A Synthesis," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 131-50, June.
  7. Branco, Fernando, 1995. "Multi-object Auctions: On the Use of Combinational Bids," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 1216, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1996. "Creating Competition through Interconnection: Theory and Practice," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 227-56, November.
  9. Mark Armstrong & Simon Cowan & John Vickers, 1994. "Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510790, December.
  10. Robert J. Weber, 1981. "Multiple-Object Auctions," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 496, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  11. Marcel Boyer, 1995. "La réglementation incitative," CIRANO Papers, CIRANO 95c-01, CIRANO.
  12. Wilson, Robert, 1979. "Auctions of Shares," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 675-89, November.
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Cited by:
  1. Harry J. Paarsch & Bruce S. Shearer, 1997. "Fixed Wages, Piece Rates, and Intertemporal Productivity: A Study of Tree Planters in British Columbia," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO 97s-01, CIRANO.
  2. Élisabeth Lefebvre & Louis A. Lefebvre, 1997. "Global Strategic Benchmarking, Critical Capabilities and Performance of Aerospace Subcontractors," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO 97s-10, CIRANO.
  3. René Garcia & Éric Renault, 1997. "A Note on Hedging in ARCH and Stochastic Volatility Option Pricing Models," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO 97s-13, CIRANO.
  4. Marcel Boyer, 1997. "L'économie des organisations : Mythes et réalités," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO 97s-02, CIRANO.
  5. Eric Ghysels & Joanna Jasiak, 1997. "GARCH for Irregularly Spaced Data: The ACD-GARCH Model," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO 97s-06, CIRANO.
  6. Benoit A. Aubert & Michel Patry & Suzanne Rivard, 1997. "La régie des services informatiques : Le rôle de la mesure et des compétences dans les décisions d'impartition," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO 97s-04, CIRANO.


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