Many network industries (telecommunications, electricity, natural gas, postal services, water and sewage services, etc.) are confronted with significant logistic and behavioral problems in their transition towards competition. In this article, I first recall some general principes and fundamental facts and issues before proceeding with the basic procedures through which competition can be introduced in telecommunications markets, that is the access pricing rules. I compare the efficient component pricing rule, the Ramsay pricing rule, the global price cap rule, and show how the latter could in fact be an answer to many of the concerns and questions raised in the search for an efficient way to introduce competition in telecommunications markets. I then continue by presenting some recent research on network access auctions, a possible approach to increasing competition with soft or light-handed regulation. I then conclude by raising some neglected albeit important issues.
Les industries-réseaux (télécommunications, électricité, gaz naturel, services postaux, services d'aqueduc et d'égouts, etc.) font face à de sérieux problèmes dans leur transition vers la concurrence. Dans cet article, je rappelle d'abord quelques faits et principes avant de discuter des procédures par lesquelles la concurrence peut être introduite, à savoir les règles et conditions d'accès aux réseaux. Je compare la règle de tarification efficace des composantes, la règle de Ramsey et la règle du plafonnement global des prix et je montre que cette dernière peut être la réponse à plusieurs questions soulevées dans la recherche d'une approche efficace à la transition vers la concurrence. Je poursuis avec la présentation d'un mécanisme d'enchère qui pourrait aussi permettre le développement ordonné de la concurrence. En conclusion, je rappelle divers facteurs généralement négligés0501s néanmoins importants.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1994.
"Access Pricing and Competition,"
Working papers
94-31, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Other versions:
Robert J. Weber, 1981.
"Multiple-Object Auctions,"
Discussion Papers
496, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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