Infrastructure Quality in Deregulated Industries: Is there an Underinvestment Problem?
AbstractWe investigate how various institutional settings affect a network provider’s incentives to invest in infrastructure quality. Under reasonable assumptions on demand, investment incentives turn out to be smaller under vertical separation than under vertical integration, though we also provide counter-examples. The introduction of downstream competition for the market can sometimes improve incentives. With suitable non-linear access prices investment incentives under separation become identical to those under integration.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich in its series SOI - Working Papers with number 0209.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2002
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Industrial Organization 22(2), 2004, pages 253-267
investment incentives; networks; quality; vertical externality.;
Other versions of this item:
- Buehler, Stefan & Schmutzler, Armin & Benz, Men-Andri, 2004. "Infrastructure quality in deregulated industries: is there an underinvestment problem?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 253-267, February.
- Benz, Men-Andri & Bühler, Stefan & Schmutzler, Armin, 2003. "Infrastructure Quality in Deregulated Industries: Is there an Underinvestment Problem?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3836, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
- L92 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
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