This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Environmental lobbying with imperfect monitoring of environmental quality

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Beard, Rodney
Mallawaarachchi, Thilak
Salerno, Gillian

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In this paper we present a two stage game of political lobbying for policies designed to enhance environmental quality. Unlike previous work which has tended to assume perfect monitoring of environmental quality in lobbying games we allow for imperfect monitoring of environmental quality. We characterize perfect public (politico-economic) equilibria in the game for the case of both perfect and imperfect monitoring of environmental quality and compare these with imperfect private monitoring of environmental quality. Results are discussed with respect to farmer behaviour in the context of non-point source pollution and implications for the political consequences of farm extension programmes highlighted.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5346/
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 5346.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Feb 2007
Date of revision: Oct 2007
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:5346

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

Related research
Keywords: Game theory; public choice; imperfect public monitoring; imperfect private monitoring; non-point source pollution; agricultural extension and public education;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics
Q1 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Cannot find something on IDEAS? Encourage the publisher to index it! Instructions.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-4.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.