Environmental lobbying with imperfect monitoring of environmental quality
AbstractIn this paper we present a two stage game of political lobbying for policies designed to enhance environmental quality. Unlike previous work which has tended to assume perfect monitoring of environmental quality in lobbying games we allow for imperfect monitoring of environmental quality. We characterize perfect public (politico-economic) equilibria in the game for the case of both perfect and imperfect monitoring of environmental quality and compare these with imperfect private monitoring of environmental quality. Results are discussed with respect to farmer behaviour in the context of non-point source pollution and implications for the political consequences of farm extension programmes highlighted.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 5346.
Date of creation: Feb 2007
Date of revision: Oct 2007
Game theory; public choice; imperfect public monitoring; imperfect private monitoring; non-point source pollution; agricultural extension and public education;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics
- Q1 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2007-10-20 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2007-10-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2007-10-20 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2007-10-20 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2007-10-20 (Game Theory)
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