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Mark my Words: Information and the Fear of Declaring one’s Exchange Rate Regime

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  • Pierre-Guillaume Méon
  • Geoffrey Minne

Abstract

This paper investigates the role of a free press and of the circulation of information on the capacity of a country to declare an exchange regime that is different from the regime it de facto implements. We put forward consistent evidence that increased press freedom and easier access to information results in a lower probability of untruthfully reporting the regime that is implemented. The finding is resistant to a large set of robustness checks, including controlling for democracy.

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File URL: https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/97393/1/wp11040.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles in its series Working Papers CEB with number 11-040.

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Length: 45 p.
Date of creation: Sep 2011
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published by:
Handle: RePEc:sol:wpaper:2013/97393

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Keywords: Official exchange rate regime; de facto exchange rate regime; press freedom; information; fear of floating.;

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