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Who supported the Deutsche Bundesbank?: An empirical investigation

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  • Maier, Philipp
  • Knaap, Thijs

Abstract

Abstract The relevance of public support for monetary policy has largely been overlooked in the empirical central bank literature. We have constructed a new indicator for the support of the German Bundesbank and present descriptive and empirical evidence. We nd that major German interest groups were quite heterogeneous in judging a given policy stance. Empirically, we show that (a) public support can (at least partly) oset pressure from other organized groups and (b) accounting for popular support of the central bank allows to make more accurate forecasts of the short-term interest rate.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Policy Modeling.

Volume (Year): 24 (2002)
Issue (Month): 9 (December)
Pages: 831-851

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jpolmo:v:24:y:2002:i:9:p:831-851

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505735

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References

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  1. Andrew C. Harvey, 1990. "The Econometric Analysis of Time Series, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 026208189x.
  2. Vaubel, Roland, 1997. "The bureaucratic and partisan behavior of independent central banks: German and international evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 201-224, May.
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  7. Richard Clarida & Mark Gertler, 1996. "How the Bundesbank Conducts Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 5581, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Froyen, Richard T. & Havrilesky, Thomas & Waud, Roger N., 1997. "The Asymmetric Effects of Political Pressures on U.S. Monetary Policy," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 471-493, July.
  9. Hayo, Bernd, 1998. "Inflation culture, central bank independence and price stability," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 241-263, May.
  10. Nordhaus, William D, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 169-90, April.
  11. de Haan, Jakob & van 't Hag, Gert Jan, 1995. " Variation in Central Bank Independence across Countries: Some Provisional Empirical Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 85(3-4), pages 335-51, December.
  12. Bernhard Winkler, 1999. "Is Maastricht a Good Contract?," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(1), pages 39-58, 03.
  13. Alberto Alesina & Nouriel Roubini & Gerald D. Cohen, 1997. "Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510944.
  14. Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob, 1999. "A State within the State? An Event Study on the Bundesbank (1948-1973)," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 46(1), pages 17-39, February.
  15. van Lelyveld, Iman, 1999. "Inflation or unemployment? Who cares?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 463-484, September.
  16. Adam S. Posen, 1995. "Declarations Are Not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank Independence," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10, pages 253-274 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Forza Draghi!
    by Thijs in eco.nomie.nl on 2011-02-10 22:30:23
  2. Nee is nee
    by Thijs in eco.nomie.nl on 2010-06-17 09:19:33
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Cited by:
  1. Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Geoffrey Minne, 2011. "Mark my Words: Information and the Fear of Declaring one’s Exchange Rate Regime," Working Papers CEB 11-040, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

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