Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

IMF and economic growth: The effects of programs, loans, and compliance with conditionality

Contents:

Author Info

  • Dreher, Axel

Abstract

In theory, the IMF could influence economic growth via several channels, among them advice to policy makers, money disbursed under its programs, and its conditionality. This paper tries to disentangle those effects empirically. Using panel data for 98 countries over the period 1970-2000 it analyzes whether IMF involvement influences economic growth in program countries. Consistent with the results of previous studies, it is shown that IMF programs reduce growth rates when their endogeneity is accounted for. There is only weak evidence that compliance with conditionality mitigates this negative effect. IMF loans have no statistically significant impact. --

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VC6-4JFHFF5-1/2/5f5900f6899e341f907de138a5273cb9
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal World Development.

Volume (Year): 34 (2006)
Issue (Month): 5 (May)
Pages: 769-788

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:34:y:2006:i:5:p:769-788

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Alex Mourmouras & Anna Ivanova & George C. Anayotos & Wolfgang Mayer, 2003. "What Determines the Implementation of IMF-Supported Programs?," IMF Working Papers 03/8, International Monetary Fund.
  2. Beck, T.H.L. & Clarke, G. & Groff, A. & Keefer , P. & Walsh, P., 2001. "New tools in comparative political economy: The database of political institutions," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3125517, Tilburg University.
  3. Marchesi, Silvia, 2003. "Adoption of an IMF programme and debt rescheduling. An empirical analysis," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 403-423, April.
  4. Michael Hutchison & Ilan Noy, 2003. "Macroeconomic effects of IMF-sponsored programs in Latin America: output costs, program recidivism and the vicious cycle of failed stabilizations," Pacific Basin Working Paper Series 03-02, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  5. Pastor, Manuel Jr., 1987. "The effects of IMF programs in the Third World: Debate and evidence from Latin America," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 249-262, February.
  6. Boockmann, Bernhard & Dreher, Axel, 2002. "The Contribution of the IMF and the World Bank to Economic Freedom," ZEW Discussion Papers 02-18, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  7. Zlata Hajro & Joseph Joyce, 2009. "A true test: do IMF programs hurt the poor?," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 41(3), pages 295-306.
  8. Dollar, David & Svensson, Jakob, 1998. "What explains the success or failure of structural adjustment programs?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1938, The World Bank.
  9. Conway, Patrick, 1994. "IMF lending programs: Participation and impact," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 365-391, December.
  10. Evrensel, Ayse Y., 2002. "Effectiveness of IMF-supported stabilization programs in developing countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 565-587, October.
  11. Polak, J.J., 1991. "The Changing Nature of IMF Conditionality," Princeton Studies in International Economics 184, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
  12. Helge Berger & Jakob de Haan & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2005. "Which Variables Explain Decisions on IMF Credit? An Extreme Bounds Analysis ," TWI Research Paper Series 13, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
  13. Heckman, James J, 1979. "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 153-61, January.
  14. Jacques J. Polak, 1991. "The Changing Nature of IMF Conditionality," OECD Development Centre Working Papers 41, OECD Publishing.
  15. Francisco José Veiga, 2002. "IMF arrangements, politics and the timing of stabilizations," NIPE Working Papers 2/2002, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
  16. Doroodian, Khosrow, 1993. "Macroeconomic Performance and Adjustment under Policies Commonly Supported by the International Monetary Fund," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(4), pages 849-64, July.
  17. Joseph P. Joyce, 2006. "Promises Made, Promises Broken: A Model Of Imf Program Implementation," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(3), pages 339-365, November.
  18. Julio A. Santaella, 1996. "Stylized Facts before IMF-Supported Macroeconomic Adjustment," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 43(3), pages 502-544, September.
  19. Graham Bird, 2002. "The Completion Rate of IMF Programmes: What We Know, Don't Know and Need to Know," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(6), pages 833-847, 06.
  20. Edwards, Sebastian, 1989. "The international monetary fund and the developing countries: A critical evaluation," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 7-68, January.
  21. Axel Dreher, 2002. "Does Globalization Affect Growth?," Development and Comp Systems 0210004, EconWPA, revised 04 Feb 2003.
  22. Axel Dreher, 2004. "The Influence of IMF Programs on the Re-election of Debtor Governments," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(1), pages 53-76, 03.
  23. Anna Unigovskaya & Valerie Mercer-Blackman, 2000. "Compliance with IMF Program Indicators and Growth in Transition Economies," IMF Working Papers 00/47, International Monetary Fund.
  24. Axel Dreher & Roland Vaubel, 2003. "The Causes and Consequences of IMF Conditionality," International Finance 0309004, EconWPA, revised 17 Oct 2003.
  25. International Monetary Fund, 1998. "Do IMF-Supported Programs Work? A Survey of the Cross-Country Empirical Evidence," IMF Working Papers 98/169, International Monetary Fund.
  26. Przeworski, Adam & Vreeland, James Raymond, 2000. "The effect of IMF programs on economic growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 385-421, August.
  27. Dicks-Mireaux, Louis & Mecagni, Mauro & Schadler, Susan, 2000. "Evaluating the effect of IMF lending to low-income countries," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 495-526, April.
  28. Bird, Graham, 2001. "IMF Programs: Do They Work? Can They be Made to Work Better?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 29(11), pages 1849-1865, November.
  29. Haggard, Stephan, 1985. "The politics of adjustment: lessons from the IMF's Extended Fund Facility," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 39(03), pages 505-534, June.
  30. Robert J. Barro & Jong-Wha Lee, 2002. "IMF Programs: Who is Chosen and What Are the Effects?," NBER Working Papers 8951, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  31. Bordo, Michael D. & Schwartz, Anna J., 2000. "Measuring real economic effects of bailouts: historical perspectives on how countries in financial distress have fared with and without bailouts," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 81-167, December.
  32. repec:imf:imfocp:106 is not listed on IDEAS
  33. Axel Dreher, 2004. "A Public Choice Perspective of IMF and World Bank Lending and Conditionality," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 119(3_4), pages 445-464, 06.
  34. Graham Bird & Thomas D Willett, 2004. "IMF Conditionality, Implementation and the New Political Economy of Ownership," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 46(3), pages 423-450, September.
  35. Beck, Thorsten & Clarke, George & Groff, Alberto & Keefer, Philip & Walsh, Patrick, 2000. "New tools and new tests in comparative political economy - the database of political institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2283, The World Bank.
  36. Joseph P Joyce, 2004. "Adoption, Implementation and Impact of IMF Programmes: A Review of the Issues and Evidence1," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 46(3), pages 451-467, September.
  37. Saleh M. Nsouli & Justin B. Zulu, 1985. "Adjustment Programs in Africa: The Recent Experience," IMF Occasional Papers 34, International Monetary Fund.
  38. Butkiewicz, James L. & Yanikkaya, Halit, 2005. "The Effects of IMF and World Bank Lending on Long-Run Economic Growth: An Empirical Analysis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 371-391, March.
  39. Michael P. Dooley & Jeffrey A. Frankel, 2003. "Managing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number dool03-1, August.
  40. Mohsin S. Khan, 1990. "The Macroeconomic Effects of Fund-Supported Adjustment Programs," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 37(2), pages 195-231, June.
  41. Sebastian Edwards & Julio Santaella, 1993. "Devaluation Controversies in the Developing Countries: Lessons from the Bretton Woods Era," NBER Chapters, in: A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary Reform, pages 405-460 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  42. Axel Dreher & Roland Vaubel, 2004. "Do IMF and IBRD Cause Moral Hazard and Political Business Cycles? Evidence from Panel Data," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 5-22, January.
  43. Easterly, William, 2005. "What did structural adjustment adjust?: The association of policies and growth with repeated IMF and World Bank adjustment loans," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 1-22, February.
  44. Marchesi, Silvia & Thomas, Jonathan P, 1999. "IMF Conditionality as a Screening Device," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(454), pages C111-25, March.
  45. Axel Dreher, 2003. "The influence of elections on IMF programme interruptions," The Journal of Development Studies, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 39(6), pages 101-120.
  46. Axel Dreher, 2004. "Does the IMF cause moral hazard? A critical review of the evidence," International Finance 0402003, EconWPA, revised 29 Mar 2004.
  47. Graham Bird & Dane Rowlands, 2002. "Do IMF Programmes Have a Catalytic Effect on Other International Capital Flows?," Oxford Development Studies, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 30(3), pages 229-249.
  48. Miguel A. Savastano & Michael Mussa, 1999. "The IMF Approach to Economic Stabilization," IMF Working Papers 99/104, International Monetary Fund.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:34:y:2006:i:5:p:769-788

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wendy Shamier).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.