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The Changing Nature of IMF Conditionality

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Jacques J. Polak
Abstract

In the terminology of the International Monetary Fund, "conditionality" refers to the policies the Fund expects a member to follow in order to be able to avail itself of credit from the Fund (Gold, 1979). Over the years, major changes in the landscape surrounding the Fund and in the situation of its members have brought about important changes in the content of conditionality. These changes have been most pronounced in the 1980s, and they have led to a gradual, but cumulatively fundamental, change in the Fund's relations with its borrowing members over the past decade — with further changes likely in the 1990s.

1.1 The impact of changing economic conditions

One major change affecting the Fund's conditionality has been the narrowing down of the Fund's clientele to its developing members. The Fund had been conceived as an institution to which any of its members could be expected to turn for temporary financing when faced with balance-of-payments difficulties. The main ...

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/187765075405
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Paper provided by OECD, Development Centre in its series OECD Development Centre Working Papers with number 41.

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Date of creation: Aug 1991
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Handle: RePEc:oec:devaaa:41-en

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  1. Ratha, Dilip, 2001. "Demand for World Bank lending," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2652, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Olivier Jeanne & Jonathan David Ostry & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2008. "A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality," IMF Working Papers 08/236, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Thomas D. Willett, 2002. "Towards A Broader Public Choice Analysis of the International Monetary Fund," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2002-25, Claremont Colleges. [Downloadable!]
  4. Cottarelli, Carlo & Giannini, Curzio, 1998. "Inflation, Credibility, and the Role of the International Monetary Fund," IMF Papers on Policy Analysis and Assessments 98/12, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  5. Morris Goldstein, 2001. "IMF Structural Conditionality: How Much is Too Much?," Peterson Institute Working Paper Series WP01-4, Peterson Institute for International Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Axel Dreher, 2004. "IMF and Economic Growth: The Effects of Programs, Loans, and Compliance with Conditionality," International Finance 0404004, EconWPA, revised 25 Apr 2004. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Adam, Antonis & Delis, Manthos D & Kammas, Pantelis, 2009. "Are democratic governments more efficient?," MPRA Paper 15843, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  8. Thomas Willett, 1999. "Developments in the Political Economy of Policy Coordination," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 221-253, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. B. Bosworth & S. M. Collins & Y. Chen, . "Accounting for Difference in Economic Growth," Discussion Papers 115, Brookings Institution International Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Michael Bordo & Anna J. Schwartz, 2001. "From the Exchange Stabilization Fund to the International Monetary Fund," NBER Working Papers 8100, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Frances Stewart, . "Adjustment and Poverty in Asia: Old Solutions and New Problems -," QEH Working Papers qehwps20, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford. [Downloadable!]
  12. Stephen Easton & Duane Rockerbie, 1999. "Does IMF conditionality benefit lenders?," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 135(2), pages 347-357, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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