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The politics of adjustment: lessons from the IMF's Extended Fund Facility

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  • Haggard, Stephan

Abstract

The international debt crisis has forced painful economic adjustments on the developing world. In the short run it has forced governments to seek to correct payments imbalances through stabilization programs, usually undertaken with conditional assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The crisis has also revealed deeper weaknesses in many Third World economies, weaknesses demanding more basic reforms in the structure of incentives, prices, and investment.

Suggested Citation

  • Haggard, Stephan, 1985. "The politics of adjustment: lessons from the IMF's Extended Fund Facility," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 39(3), pages 505-534, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:39:y:1985:i:03:p:505-534_01
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    Cited by:

    1. Armenia ANDRONICEANU & Gurgen OHANYAN, 2015. "Cooperation between European Governments and the IMF: Conditionality Impact on Employment within the EU," REVISTA DE MANAGEMENT COMPARAT INTERNATIONAL/REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE MANAGEMENT, Faculty of Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 16(3), pages 324-334, July.
    2. Axel Dreher, 2009. "IMF conditionality: theory and evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 233-267, October.
    3. Stephen B. Kaplan & Kaj Thomsson, 2014. "The Political Economy of Sovereign Borrowing: Explaining the Policy Choices of Highly Indebted Governments," Working Papers 2014-10, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
    4. Dreher, Axel, 2002. "The Development and Implementation of IMF and World Bank Conditionality," Discussion Paper Series 26352, Hamburg Institute of International Economics.
    5. Chwieroth, Jeffrey, 2012. ""The silent revolution": how the staff exercise informal governance over IMF lending," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 46623, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Dreher, Axel, 2006. "IMF and economic growth: The effects of programs, loans, and compliance with conditionality," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 769-788, May.
    7. Ball, Richard & Rausser, Gordon, 1995. "Governance structures and the durability of economic reforms: Evidence from inflation stabilizations," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 23(6), pages 897-912, June.
    8. Stephen B. Kaplan & Kaj Thomsson, 2014. "The Political Economy of Sovereign Debt: Global Finance and Electoral Cycles," Working Papers 2015-1, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
    9. Molly Bauer & Cesi Cruz & Benjamin Graham, 2012. "Democracies only: When do IMF agreements serve as a seal of approval?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 33-58, March.
    10. Axel Dreher, 2005. "Does the IMF Influence Fiscal and Monetary Policy?," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(3), pages 225-238.
    11. Liam Clegg, 2012. "Global governance behind closed doors: The IMF boardroom, the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, and the intersection of material power and norm stabilisation in global politics," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 285-308, September.
    12. Arpac, Ozlem & Bird, Graham & Mandilaras, Alex, 2008. "Stop Interrupting: An Empirical Analysis of the Implementation of IMF Programs," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 36(9), pages 1493-1513, September.
    13. Oliveira, Gesner, 1991. "Resistance to Implementing IMF Stabilization Plans: Evidence from a Cross-Country Study," Brazilian Review of Econometrics, Sociedade Brasileira de Econometria - SBE, vol. 11(1), April.
    14. Jeffrey Chwieroth, 2013. "“The silent revolution:” How the staff exercise informal governance over IMF lending," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 265-290, June.

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