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The Development and Implementation of IMF and World Bank Conditionality

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Author Info
Axel Dreher

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Abstract

The paper presents a detailed description of IMF and World Bank conditionality and tries to explain changes in this conditionality over time as well as differences between the two institutions. Using panel data it is shown that the number of Fund conditions seem to be influenced by contemporaneous World Bank activity. Moreover, the paper tries to explain compliance with World Bank conditionality as well as interruptions of IMF programs in the recipient countries. Compliance with World Bank conditionality is lower in election years and pre- election years. Breakdowns of IMF programs are less likely in election years. However, no other political factors seem to influence interruptions and compliance systematically. The paper describes the institutions’ reaction to recent criticism and concludes with implications for reform.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series International Finance with number 0207003.

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Date of creation: 25 Jul 2002
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpif:0207003

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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: IMF; World Bank; Conditionality; Compliance; Program Interruption;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Dhonte, Pierre, 1997. "Conditionality as an Instrument of Borrower Credibility," IMF Papers on Policy Analysis and Assessments 97/2, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  2. Saleh M. Nsouli & Justin B. Zulu, 1985. "Adjustment Programs in Africa: The Recent Experience," IMF Occasional Papers 34, International Monetary Fund.
  3. Nadeem Ul Haque & Mohsin S. Khan, 1998. "Do IMF-Supported Programs Work? A Survey of the Cross-Country Empirical Evidence," IMF Working Papers 98/169, International Monetary Fund.
  4. Axel Dreher & Roland Vaubel, 2002. "Does the IMF cause moral hazard and political business cycles? Evidence from panel data," International Finance 0207002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Nash, John & DEC, 1993. "Implementation of trade reform in sub-Saharan Africa : how much heat and how much light?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1218, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  6. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1999. "The World Bank at the Millennium," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(459), pages F577-97, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Boockmann, Bernhard & Dreher, Axel, 2003. "The contribution of the IMF and the World Bank to economic freedom," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 633-649, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Edwards, Sebastian, 1989. "The international monetary fund and the developing countries: A critical evaluation," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 7-68, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Conway, Patrick, 1994. "IMF lending programs: Participation and impact," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 365-391, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Axel Dreher, 2004. "The Influence of IMF Programs on the Re-election of Debtor Governments," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16(1), pages 53-76, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Beck, Thorsten & Clarke, George & Groff, Alberto & Keefer, Philip & Walsh, Patrick, 2000. "New tools and new tests in comparative political economy - the database of political institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2283, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  12. Pierre Dhonte, 1997. "Conditionality as an Instrument of Borrower Credibility," IMF Policy Discussion Papers 97/2, International Monetary Fund.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Michael Hutchison & Ilan Noy, 2003. "Macroeconomic effects of IMF-sponsored programs in Latin America: output costs, program recidivism and the vicious cycle of failed stabilizations," Pacific Basin Working Paper Series 03-02, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Robert Hamwey, 2005. "Expanding national policy space for development: Why the Multilateral Trading System must change," Development and Comp Systems 0511005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. Josepa Miquel-Florensa, 2007. "Financing Multi-stage projects under moral hazard and limited commitment," Working Papers 2007_4, York University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Hefeker, Carsten, 2003. "Handels- und Finanz- architektur im Umbruch: Globale Integration und die institutionelle Arbeitsteilung von IWF, Weltbank und WTO," Discussion Paper Series 26158, Hamburg Institute of International Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Axel Dreher & Nathan Jensen, 2005. "Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the impact of US interests on IMF Conditions," KOF Working papers 05-118, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Morrissey, Oliver, 2002. "Recipient Governments' Willingness and Ability to Meet Aid Conditionality: The Effectiveness of Aid Finance and Conditions," Working Papers UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER). [Downloadable!]
  7. Josepa Miquel-Florensa, 2007. "Aid Effectiveness: A comparison of Tied and Untied Aid," Working Papers 2007_3, York University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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