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Stop Interrupting: An Empirical Analysis of the Implementation of IMF Programs

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  • Arpac, Ozlem
  • Bird, Graham
  • Mandilaras, Alex

Abstract

Summary For many years the analysis of IMF conditionality overlooked the extent to which it was implemented. However, more recently, increasing attention has been paid to implementation. Theoretical contributions have focused on the importance of special interest groups, but empirical evidence has failed to provide compelling support for the theory. Indeed, empirical studies have reported mixed results that sometimes seem to be conflicting. This paper identifies a range of economic, political and institutional factors that may, in principle, influence implementation. Focusing in particular on the irreversible interruption of IMF programs, it tests an econometric model designed to capture these influences 'over 1992-2004' exploiting improved sources of data. The results suggest that significant determinants of interruption are trade openness, the existence of veto players and the amount of resources committed by the Fund. The paper interprets the results, tests their robustness, briefly examines cases that initially appear to be inconsistent with the overall findings and discusses the implications of the results for policy.

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  • Arpac, Ozlem & Bird, Graham & Mandilaras, Alex, 2008. "Stop Interrupting: An Empirical Analysis of the Implementation of IMF Programs," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 36(9), pages 1493-1513, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:36:y:2008:i:9:p:1493-1513
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    Cited by:

    1. Bernhard Reinsberg & Thomas Stubbs & Alexander Kentikelenis, 2022. "Compliance, defiance, and the dependency trap: International Monetary Fund program interruptions and their impact on capital markets," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(4), pages 1022-1041, October.
    2. Stubbs, Thomas H. & Kentikelenis, Alexander E. & King, Lawrence P., 2016. "Catalyzing Aid? The IMF and Donor Behavior in Aid Allocation," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 511-528.
    3. Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati & Samuel Brazys, 2023. "Does cultural diversity hinder the implementation of IMF-supported programs? An empirical investigation," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 87-116, January.
    4. Javed, Omer, 2013. "Determinants of Institutional Quality: A Case Study of IMF Programme Countries," MPRA Paper 51344, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Dennis Essers & Stefaan Ide, 2017. "The IMF and precautionary lending : An empirical evaluation of the selectivity and effectiveness of the flexible credit line," Working Paper Research 323, National Bank of Belgium.
    6. Ali Burak Güven, 2012. "The IMF, the World Bank, and the Global Economic Crisis: Exploring Paradigm Continuity," Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 43(4), pages 869-898, July.
    7. Molly Bauer & Cesi Cruz & Benjamin Graham, 2012. "Democracies only: When do IMF agreements serve as a seal of approval?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 33-58, March.
    8. Öhler, Hannes & Nunnenkamp, Peter & Dreher, Axel, 2012. "Does conditionality work? A test for an innovative US aid scheme," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 138-153.
    9. Ozlem Arpac & Graham Bird, 2009. "Turkey and the IMF: A case study in the political economy of policy implementation," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 135-157, June.
    10. Oberdabernig, Doris A., 2013. "Revisiting the Effects of IMF Programs on Poverty and Inequality," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 113-142.
    11. Stubbs, Thomas & Kentikelenis, Alexander & Stuckler, David & McKee, Martin & King, Lawrence, 2017. "The impact of IMF conditionality on government health expenditure: A cross-national analysis of 16 West African nations," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 220-227.
    12. Essers, Dennis & Ide, Stefaan, 2019. "The IMF and precautionary lending: An empirical evaluation of the selectivity and effectiveness of the Flexible Credit Line," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 25-61.
    13. Csaba, László, 2011. "A magyar átalakulás és fejlődés néhány általánosítható elméleti tanulsága [Some generalizable theoretical lessons of the Hungarian transformation and development]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(10), pages 813-831.
    14. Irina Andone & Beatrice D. Scheubel, 2017. "Memorable Encounters? Own and Neighbours' Experience with IMF Conditionality and IMF Stigma," CESifo Working Paper Series 6399, CESifo.
    15. Graham Bird & Dane Rowlands, 2017. "The Effect of IMF Programmes on Economic Growth in Low Income Countries: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 53(12), pages 2179-2196, December.
    16. Sanchez Martin, Miguel Eduardo & Escribano Frances, Gonzalo & de Arce Borda, Rafael, 2014. "How regional integration and transnational energy networks have boosted FDI in Turkey (and may cease to do so): a case study: how geo-political alliances and regional networks matter," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6970, The World Bank.
    17. Javed, Omer, 2014. "Institutional quality, macroeconomic stabilization and economic growth: a case study of IMF programme countries," MPRA Paper 56370, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. repec:got:cegedp:103 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Daniel Hansen, 2023. "The democratic (dis)advantage: The conditional impact of democracy on credit risk and sovereign default," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1), pages 356-410, March.

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