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Media as watchdogs: The role of news media in electoral competition

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Author Info

  • Chan, Jimmy
  • Suen, Wing

Abstract

We develop an equilibrium model to analyze the role of the media in electoral competition. When policy payoffs are state-dependent, party policies do not converge to the median voter's ideal policy if the media report only party policies. News analysis about the state, though possibly biased, can discipline off-equilibrium deviations and make the parties adopt more centrist policies. Since voters are rational, the party favored by the media need not win with a higher probability. Instead, media bias may reduce the effectiveness of electoral competition and lead to more polarized policies.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V64-4VTVR2V-2/2/698689043d2840462756bab7d2ed2c0d
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 53 (2009)
Issue (Month): 7 (October)
Pages: 799-814

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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:53:y:2009:i:7:p:799-814

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer

Related research

Keywords: Media bias Cheap talk Policy convergence;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Riccardo Puglisi, 2006. "Being The New York Times: Thepolitical Behaviour Of A Newspaper," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 20, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  2. Stone, Daniel F., 2013. "Media and gridlock," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 94-104.
  3. John Duggan & Cesar Martinelli, 2008. "Rational Expectations and Media Slant," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001844, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Ascensión Andina-Díaz, 2007. "Reinforcement vs. change: The political influence of the media," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 65-81, April.
  5. Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Geoffrey Minne, 2011. "Mark my Words: Information and the Fear of Declaring one’s Exchange Rate Regime," Working Papers CEB 11-040, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  6. Corneo, Giacomo, 2006. "Media capture in a democracy: The role of wealth concentration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 37-58, January.
  7. John Duggan & Cesar Martinelli, 2008. "The Role of Media Slant in Elections and Economics," Working Papers 0802, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
  8. Jiancai Pi, 2010. "Media Capture and Local Government Accountability," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2010(3), pages 273-283.

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