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The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as an Evolutionary Learning Process

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  • Ania, Ana B.
  • Wagener, Andreas

Abstract

We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule "imitate the best." In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare beneficiaries, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibrium), decentralized best-response behavior (Nash equilibrium), and coordinated policies. The main result is that the OMC allows policy coordination on a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibria, favoring in particular coordination on intermediate values of the policy instrument.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Munich, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 11109.

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Date of creation: 23 Nov 2009
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Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenec:11109

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Keywords: Open Method of Coordination; Finite-population Evolutionarily Stable Strategy; Imitation; Mobility; Redistribution.;

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Cited by:
  1. Ana B. Ania & Andreas Wagener, 2014. "Decentrqalized Redistribution in a Laboratory Federation," Vienna Economics Papers 1402, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  2. Strunz, Sebastian & Gawel, Erik & Lehmann, Paul, 2014. "Towards a general "Europeanization" of EU Member States' energy policies?," UFZ Discussion Papers 17/2014, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ), Division of Social Sciences (ÖKUS).

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