Migration and Social Insurance
AbstractA wide variety of social protection systems coexist within the EU. Some member states provide social insurance that is of Beveridgean inspiration (with universal and more or less flat benefits), while others offer a system that is mainly Bismarckian (with benefits related to past contributions). Labor mobility raises concerns about the sustainability of the most generous and redistributive (Beveridgean) insurance systems. We address this issue in a two-country setting, where individuals differ in mobility cost (attachment to their native country). A Bismarckian insurance system is not affected by migration while a Beveridgean one is. Our results suggest that the race-to-the-bottom affecting tax rates may be more important under Beveridge-Beveridge competition than under Beveridge-Bismarck competition. Finally, we study the strategic choice of the type of social protection. We show that Bismarckian governments may find it beneficial to adopt a Beveridgean insurance system.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) in its series TSE Working Papers with number 11-217.
Date of creation: Jan 2011
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Cremer, Helmuth & Goulão, Catarina, 2011. "Migration and Social Insurance," IDEI Working Papers 657, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Helmuth Cremer & Catarina Goulão, 2011. "Migration and Social Insurance," CESifo Working Paper Series 3478, CESifo Group Munich.
- Helmuth Cremer & Catarina Goulão, 2010. "Migration and social insurance," Working Papers 2010/53, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-11-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-IAS-2011-11-28 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2011-11-28 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-MIG-2011-11-28 (Economics of Human Migration)
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