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Dismissal Protection and Long-term Sickness Absence - First Evidence from Germany

Author

Listed:
  • Gürtzgen, Nicole

    (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany ; Univ. Regensburg ; ZEW)

  • Hiesinger, Karolin

    (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany)

Abstract

"This paper analyses the causal effects of weaker dismissal protection on the incidence of long-term sickness (> six weeks). We exploit a German policy change, which shifted the threshold exempting small establishments from dismissal protection from five to ten workers. Using administrative data, we find a significantly negative reform effect on transitions into long-term sickness in the second year after a worker has entered an establishment. This response is due to a behavioural, rather than a compositional effect and is mainly driven by less skilled workers. Our results further indicate that the reform did not alter the probability of involuntary unemployment after sickness." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

Suggested Citation

  • Gürtzgen, Nicole & Hiesinger, Karolin, 2020. "Dismissal Protection and Long-term Sickness Absence - First Evidence from Germany," IAB-Discussion Paper 202022, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].
    • Handle: RePEc:iab:iabdpa:202022
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    File URL: https://doku.iab.de/discussionpapers/2020/dp2220.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bundesrepublik Deutschland ; Auswirkungen ; Schwellenwert ; Dauer ; Fehlzeiten ; IAB-Betriebs-Historik-Panel ; IAB-Biografiedaten ; Integrierte Erwerbsbiografien ; Krankheit ; Kündigungsschutz ; Reformpolitik ; Risiko ; Arbeitslosigkeit ; Arbeitsverhalten ; 1999-2010;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior
    • J28 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy
    • J38 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Public Policy
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
    • J88 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards - - - Public Policy
    • K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact

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