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Screening Disability Insurance Applications

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Author Info

  • de Jong, Philip

    ()
    (University of Amsterdam)

  • Lindeboom, Maarten

    ()
    (VU University Amsterdam)

  • van der Klaauw, Bas

    ()
    (VU University Amsterdam)

Abstract

This paper investigates the effects of intensified screening of disability insurance benefit applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in 2 of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more intense. The empirical results show that intense screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. This provides evidence both for direct effects of the more intensive screening on work resumption during sickness absenteeism and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. We do not find any spillover effects to the inflow into unemployment insurance. A cost-benefit analysis shows that the costs of the intensified screening are only a small fraction of its benefits.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 1981.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2006
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Journal of the European Economic Association, 2011, 9(1), 106-129
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1981

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Related research

Keywords: sickness absenteeism; self-screening; policy evaluation; experiment; disability insurance;

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References

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  1. Bertil Holmlund & Qian Liu & Oskar Nordström Skans, 2006. "Mind the Gap? Estimating the Effects of Postponing Higher Education," CESifo Working Paper Series 1792, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Keisuke Hirano & Guido W. Imbens & Geert Ridder, 2003. "Efficient Estimation of Average Treatment Effects Using the Estimated Propensity Score," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 71(4), pages 1161-1189, 07.
  3. Janice Halpern & Jerry A. Hausman, 1985. "Choice Under Uncertainty: A Model of Applications for the Social Security Disability Insurance Program," NBER Working Papers 1690, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. David H. Autor & Mark G. Duggan, 2003. "The Rise In The Disability Rolls And The Decline In Unemployment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 118(1), pages 157-205, February.
  5. Jonathan Gruber, 1996. "Disability Insurance Benefits and Labor Supply," NBER Working Papers 5866, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Parsons, Donald O, 1991. "Self-Screening in Targeted Public Transfer Programs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 859-76, August.
  7. Johansson, Per, 2006. "Using internal replication to establish a treatment effect," Working Paper Series, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy 2006:3, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  8. de Jong, Philip & Lindeboom, Maarten & van der Klaauw, Bas, 2006. "Screening disability insurance applications," Working Paper Series, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy 2006:15, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  9. Forslund, Anders & Nordström Skans, Oskar, 2006. "Swedish youth labour market policies revisited," Working Paper Series, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy 2006:6, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  10. Johansson, Per & Palme, Marten, 1996. "Do economic incentives affect work absence? Empirical evidence using Swedish micro data," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 195-218, February.
  11. Aslund, Olof & Östh, John & Zenou, Yves, 2006. "How Important is Access to Jobs? Old Question - Improved Answer," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5586, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Bound, John & Burkhauser, Richard V., 1999. "Economic analysis of transfer programs targeted on people with disabilities," Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 51, pages 3417-3528 Elsevier.
  13. repec:dgr:uvatin:2006018 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Öster, Anna, 2006. "Parental unemployment and children's school performance," Working Paper Series, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy 2006:5, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  15. Per Johansson & Mårten Palme, 2002. "Assessing the Effect of Public Policy on Worker Absenteeism," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 37(2), pages 381-409.
  16. Wang, Iris J Y & Carling, Kenneth & Nääs, Ola, 2006. "High school students' summer jobs and their ensuing labour market achievement," Working Paper Series, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy 2006:14, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
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