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Long-Term Absenteeism and Moral Hazard: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

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Author Info
Nicolas R. Ziebarth

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Abstract

Sick leave payments represent a significant portion of public health expenditures and labor costs. Reductions in replacement levels are a commonly used instrument to tackle moral hazard and to increase the efficiency of the health insurance market. In Germany's Statutory Health Insurance (SHI) system, the replacement level for periods of sickness of up to six weeks was reduced from 100 percent to 80 percent of an employee's gross wage at the end of 1996. At the same time, the replacement level for individuals absent for a long-term period, i.e., from the seventh week onwards, was reduced from 80 to 70 percent. We show theoretically that the net reform effects on long-term absenteeism can be disentangled into a direct and an indirect effect. Using SOEP data, a natural control group, and two different treatment groups, we estimate the net and the direct effect on the incidence and duration of long-term absenteeism by difference-in-differences. Our findings suggest that, on population average, the reforms have not affected long-term absenteeism significantly, which is in accordance with our theoretical predictions, assuming that employees on long-term sick leave are seriously sick. However, we find some heterogeneity in the effects and a small but significant decrease in the duration of long-term absenteeism for the poor and middle-aged full-time employed persons. All in all, moral hazard and presenteeism seem to be less of an issue in the right tail of the sickness spell distribution. Finally, our calculations suggest that from 1997 to 2006, around five billion euros were redistributed from persons on long-term sick leave to the SHI insurance pool.

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Paper provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its series Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin with number 888.

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Length: 49 p.
Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp888

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Related research
Keywords: Long-term absenteeism; sick pay; moral hazard; natural experiment; SOEP;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply

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  1. SOEP based publications
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Lindbeck, Assar & Palme, Mårten & Persson, Mats, 2006. "Job Security and Work Absence: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Working Paper Series 660, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Puhani, Patrick A., 2008. "The Treatment Effect, the Cross Difference, and the Interaction Term in Nonlinear “Difference-in-Differences” Models," IZA Discussion Papers 3478, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  3. Monojit Chatterji & Colin J. Tilley, 2002. "Sickness, absenteeism, presenteeism, and sick pay," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(4), pages 669-687, October.
  4. Stephen G Donald & Kevin Lang, 2007. "Inference with Difference-in-Differences and Other Panel Data," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 89(2), pages 221-233, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 2000. "Unnatural Experiments? Estimating the Incidence of Endogenous Policies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(467), pages F672-94, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Brown, Sarah & Sessions, John G, 1996. " The Economics of Absence: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 10(1), pages 23-53, March.
  7. Riphahn, Regina T., 2004. "Employment protection and effort among German employees," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 353-357, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Jan Erik Askildsen & Espen Bratberg & Øivind Anti Nilsen, 2005. "Unemployment, labor force composition and sickness absence: a panel data study," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(11), pages 1087-1101. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Barmby, Tim & Sessions, John G & Treble, John G, 1994. " Absenteeism, Efficiency Wages and Shirking," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 96(4), pages 561-66.
  10. Engellandt, Axel & Riphahn, Regina T., 2005. "Temporary contracts and employee effort," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 281-299, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, 2003. "Cluster-Sample Methods in Applied Econometrics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 133-138, May. [Downloadable!]
  12. Magnus Henrekson & Mats Persson, 2004. "The Effects on Sick Leave of Changes in the Sickness Insurance System," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(1), pages 87-114, January. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Deb, Partha & Trivedi, Pravin K, 1997. "Demand for Medical Care by the Elderly: A Finite Mixture Approach," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(3), pages 313-36, May-June. [Downloadable!]
  14. Georges Dionne & Benoit Dostie, 2007. "New Evidence on the Determinants of Absenteeism Using Linked Employer-Employee Data," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 61(1), pages 108-120, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Brown, Sarah, 1994. "Dynamic Implications of Absence Behaviour," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 26(12), pages 1163-75, December.
  16. Ose, Solveig Osborg, 2005. "Working conditions, compensation and absenteeism," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 161-188, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Johansson, Per & Palme, Marten, 2005. "Moral hazard and sickness insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1879-1890, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-28.


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