The Effect of Employment Protection on Worker Effort: A Comparison of Absenteeism During and After Probation
AbstractEmployment protection systems are known to generate significant distortions in firms’ hiring and firing decisions. We know much less about the impact of these regulations on workers behaviour. The goal of this Paper is to fill in this gap and in particular to assess whether the provision of employment protection induces more absenteeism among workers. Our analysis is based on weekly observations for the 858 white-collar workers hired by a large Italian bank between January 1993 and February 1995. These workers begin to be protected against firing only after the twelfth week of tenure and we observe them for one year. We show that the number of day’s absence per week more than doubles once employment protection is granted. This result offers a preliminary but robust piece of evidence to evaluate a consequence of employment protection systems that has been relatively neglected in the policy debate in Europe.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 3847.
Date of creation: Mar 2003
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- Andrea Ichino & Regina T. Riphahn, 2001. "The Effect of Employment Protection on Worker Effort. A Comparison of Absenteeism During and After Probation," CESifo Working Paper Series 596, CESifo Group Munich.
- Ichino, Andrea & Riphahn, Regina T., 2001. "The Effect of Employment Protection on Worker Effort: A Comparison of Absenteeism During and After Probation," IZA Discussion Papers 385, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- J38 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Public Policy
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-LAB-2003-07-13 (Labour Economics)
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Employment protection effects
by chris dillow in Stumbling and Mumbling on 2011-01-11 13:43:39
- ¿Funcionarán las medidas contra el absentismo en el sector público?
by Samuel Bentolila in Nada Es Gratis on 2012-05-22 06:00:37
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