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Absenteeism In The Italian Public Sector: The Effects Of Changes In Sick Leave Compensation

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Author Info

  • Maria De Paola

    ()

  • Valeria Pupo

    ()

  • Vincenzo Scoppa

    ()
    (Dipartimento di Economia e Statistica, Università della Calabria)

Abstract

In this paper we analyse how the absence behaviour of Italian public sector employees has been affected by a law, passed in June 2008, reducing sick leave compensation and increasing monitoring intensity. We use micro-data on a sample of about 860 workers, employed at an Italian public administration, for years going from 2005 to 2009. We estimate the effect of the reform using linear and non-linear estimators. As predicted by agency theory, individuals react to economic incentives: the employees in our sample have considerably reduced their absences under the new regime. Since the reform has affected employees in a non uniform way, we show that the reduction of absenteeism is significantly stronger for employees suffering higher earning losses. Results also show that while the reform has reduced the duration of short absence spells, the duration of long spells has increased. We argue that this is due to the non-linearity of earning losses introduced by the new law.

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File URL: http://www.ecostat.unical.it/RePEc/WorkingPapers/WP16_2009.pdf
File Function: First version, 2009-10
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Università della Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza (Ex Dipartimento di Economia e Statistica) in its series Working Papers with number 200916.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:clb:wpaper:200916

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Postal: Università della Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza, Ponte Pietro Bucci, Cubo 0/C, I-87036 Arcavacata di Rende, CS, Italy
Phone: +39 0984 492413
Fax: +39 0984 492421
Web page: http://www.unical.it/portale/strutture/dipartimenti_240/disesf/
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Related research

Keywords: Worker Absenteeism; Moral Hazard; Shirking; Sickness; Insurance Contracts;

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References

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  1. Georges Dionne & Benoit Dostie, 2005. "New Evidence on the Determinants of Absenteeism Using Linked Employer-Employee Data," Cahiers de recherche 05-04, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
  2. Henrekson, Magnus & Persson, Mats, 2001. "The Effects on Sick Leave of Changes in the Sickness Insurance System," Seminar Papers 697, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  3. repec:lan:wpaper:3173 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Barmby, Tim & Sessions, John G & Treble, John G, 1994. " Absenteeism, Efficiency Wages and Shirking," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 96(4), pages 561-66.
  5. Johansson, Per & Palme, Marten, 2005. "Moral hazard and sickness insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1879-1890, September.
  6. Nicolas R. Ziebarth, 2009. "Long-Term Absenteeism and Moral Hazard: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 172, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
  7. Per Pettersson-Lidbom & Peter Skogman Thoursie, 2013. "Temporary Disability Insurance and Labor Supply: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 115(2), pages 485-507, 04.
  8. Tim A. Barmby & Marco G. Ercolani & John G. Treble, 2002. "Sickness Absence: An International Comparison," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(480), pages F315-F331, June.
  9. Arai, Mahmood & Skogman Thoursie, Peter, 2001. "Incentives and Selection in Cyclical Absenteeism," Working Paper Series 167, Trade Union Institute for Economic Research.
  10. Johansson, Per & Palme, Marten, 1996. "Do economic incentives affect work absence? Empirical evidence using Swedish micro data," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 195-218, February.
  11. repec:lan:wpaper:3020 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Regina T. Riphahn & Anja Thalmaier, 2001. "Behavioral Effects of Probation Periods: An Analysis of Worker Absenteeism," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), Justus-Liebig University Giessen, Department of Statistics and Economics, vol. 221(2), pages 179-201.
  13. Leigh, J. Paul, 1985. "The effects of unemployment and the business cycle on absenteeism," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 159-170, May.
  14. Riphahn, Regina T., 2004. "Employment protection and effort among German employees," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 353-357, December.
  15. Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2010. "Shirking and employment protection legislation: Evidence from a natural experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 276-280, May.
  16. Barmby, Tim, 2002. "Worker absenteeism: a discrete hazard model with bivariate heterogeneity," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 469-476, September.
  17. repec:lan:wpaper:3018 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Rainer Winkelmann, 1999. "Wages, firm size and absenteeism," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(6), pages 337-341.
  19. William P. Curington, 1994. "Compensation for Permanent Impairment and the Duration of Work Absence: Evidence from Four Natural Experiments," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 29(3), pages 888-910.
  20. Moulton, Brent R., 1986. "Random group effects and the precision of regression estimates," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 385-397, August.
  21. Hesselius, Patrik, 2007. "Does sickness absence increase the risk of unemployment?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 288-310, April.
  22. repec:lan:wpaper:2926 is not listed on IDEAS
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Edmundo Beteta & Manuel Willington, 2007. "Planes Mínimos Obligatorios en Mercados de Seguros de Salud Segmentados," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv198, Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines.
  2. De Paola, Maria, 2008. "Absenteeism and Peer Interaction Effects: Evidence from an Italian Public Institute," MPRA Paper 11425, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. repec:ese:iserwp:2011-10 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Francesco D'Amuri, 2011. "Monetary incentives vs. monitoring in addressing absenteeism: experimental evidence," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 787, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  5. Alessandra Del Boca & Maria Laura Parisi, 2010. "Why does the private sector react like the public to law 133? A microeconometric analysis of sickness absence in Italy," Working Papers 1008, University of Brescia, Department of Economics.

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