Securing Basic Well-being for All
AbstractThe purpose of this paper is to examine the possibility of a social choice rule to implement a social policy for “securing basic well-being for all.” For this purpose, the paper introduces a new scheme of social choice, called a social relation function (SRF), which associates to each profile of individual well-being appraisals and each profile of group-evaluations a reflexive and transitive binary relation over the set of social policies. As a part of the domains of SRFs, the available class of group evaluations is constrained by the following three conditions: Basic Well-being Condition, Restricted Monotonicity, and Refrain Condition. Furthermore, two axioms, the non-negative response (NR) and the weak Pareto condition (WP), are introduced as the two basic condititions of SRFs. NR demands giving priority to the evaluations of disadvantage groups, while treating them as formally equal relative to each other. WP requires treating impartially the well-being appraisals of all individuals. In conclusion, this paper shows that, under some reasonable assumptions, there exists a SRF which satisfies NR and WP.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number 591.
Length: 34 p.
Date of creation: Jul 2013
Date of revision:
basic well-being; individual well-being appraisals; social relation functions;
Other versions of this item:
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-08-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-HAP-2013-08-10 (Economics of Happiness)
- NEP-MIC-2013-08-10 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Carmen Herrero, 1996.
"Capabilities and utilities,"
Review of Economic Design,
Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 69-88, December.
- Reiko Gotoh & Naoki Yoshihara, 2003.
"A class of fair distribution rules à la Rawls and Sen,"
Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 63-88, 08.
- Reiko Gotoh & Naoki Yoshihara, 2000. "A Class of Fair Distribution Rules a la Rawls and Sen," Discussion Paper Series a389, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Marc Fleurbaey, 2007.
"Social choice and the indexing dilemma,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 633-648, December.
- Pattanaik, Prasanta K. & Xu, Yongsheng, 2012. "On Dominance And Context-Dependence In Decisions Involving Multiple Attributes," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 28(02), pages 117-132, July.
- Marc Fleurbaey & Philippe Mongin, 2004.
"The News of the Death of Welfare Economics is Greatly Exaggerated,"
- Marc Fleurbaey & Philippe Mongin, 2005. "The news of the death of welfare economics is greatly exaggerated," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 381-418, December.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Hiromichi Miyake).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.