Deforestation as an externality problem to be solved efficiently and fairly
AbstractThe international community recently agreed on a mechanism called REDD+ to reduce deforestation in tropical countries. However the mechanism, by its very nature, has no reason to induce a Pareto optimal reduction of deforestation. The aim of this article is to propose an alternative class of mechanisms for negative externalities that implements Pareto optimal outcomes as Nash Subgame Perfect Equilibria, and that satisfies some fairness properties, in particular two original axioms of environmental responsibility. Outcomes are individually rational and the scheme does take into account environmental responsibility in the sense of our two axioms. However, envy freeness, even in a weak form adapted to the deforestation problem, turns out to be hard to achieve without dropping the other properties.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier in its series Working Papers with number 11-17.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2011
Date of revision: Aug 2011
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Avenue Raymond Dugrand, CS 79606, 34960 Montpellier Cedex 2
Web page: http://www.lameta.univ-montp1.fr/
More information through EDIRC
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2011-12-13 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2011-12-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2011-12-13 (Environmental Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Yan Chen & Robert S. Gazzale, 2004.
"When Does Learning in Games Generate Convergence to Nash Equilibria? The Role of Supermodularity in an Experimental Setting,"
Department of Economics Working Papers
2004-02, Department of Economics, Williams College.
- Yan Chen & Robert Gazzale, 2004. "When Does Learning in Games Generate Convergence to Nash Equilibria? The Role of Supermodularity in an Experimental Setting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1505-1535, December.
- Fleurbaey, Marc, 2012.
"Fairness, Responsibility, and Welfare,"
Oxford University Press, number 9780199653591.
- Danziger, Leif & Schnytzer, Adi, 1991. "Implementing the Lindahl voluntary-exchange mechanism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 55-64, April.
- Marc Fleurbaey & François Maniquet, 2006.
"Compensation and responsibility,"
- Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Jean-Christophe Poudou & Sébastien Roussel, 2012.
"North / South Contractual Design through the REDD+ Scheme,"
2012.89, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Jean-Christophe Poudou & Sébastien Roussel, 2012. "North / South Contractual Design through the REDD+ Scheme," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12059, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Jean-Christophe Poudou & Sébastien Roussel, 2012. "North / South Contractual Design through the REDD+ Scheme," Working Papers 12-31, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Oct 2012.
- Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Jean-Christophe Poudou & Sébastien Roussel, 2012. "North / South Contractual Design through the REDD+ Scheme," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00747405, HAL.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Patricia Modat).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.