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Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public goods experiment Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Bracht, Juergen
Figuieres, Charles
Ratto, Marisa
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics .
Volume (Year): 92 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (February)
Pages: 54-90
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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:92:y:2008:i:1-2:p:54-90Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578
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Paper Juergen Bracht & Charles Figuières & Marisa Ratto, 2004.
"Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public good experiment ,"
IDEP Working Papers
0409, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France.
[Downloadable!] Juergen Bracht & Charles Figuieres & Marisa Ratto, 2004.
"Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public good experiment ,"
The Centre for Market and Public Organisation
04/102, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
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Other versions: Marc WILLINGER & Anthony ZIEGELMEYER, 1999.
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Varian, H,R., 1991.
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Attiyeh, Greg & Franciosi, Robert & Isaac, R Mark, 2000.
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Falkinger, Josef, 1996.
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Althammer, Wilhelm & Buchholz, Wolfgang, 1993.
"Lindahl-equilibria as the outcome of a non-cooperative game : A reconsideration ,"
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Harstad, Ronald M. & Marrese, Michael, 1982.
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"Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism ,"
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0305007, EconWPA.
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Chen, Yan & Plott, Charles R., 1996.
"The Groves-Ledyard mechanism: An experimental study of institutional design ,"
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Charness, Gary & Frechette, Guillaume R. & Qin, Cheng-Zhong, 2007.
"Endogenous transfers in the Prisoner's Dilemma game: An experimental test of cooperation and coordination ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 287-306, August.
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Other versions: Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gaechter, 2009.
"Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Good Experiments ,"
Discussion Papers
2009-04, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
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