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Understanding Collective Action: Matching Behavior

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Guttman, Joel M
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Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 68 (1978)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 251-55
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:68:y:1978:i:2:p:251-55

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  8. Hal R. Varian, 1994. "Sequential Provision of Public Goods," Public Economics 9401003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Joel Guttman & Michael Miller, 1979. "Endogenous Conjectural Variations in Duopoly," UCLA Economics Working Papers 150, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Juergen Bracht & Charles Figuieres & Marisa Ratto, 2004. "Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public good experiment," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 04/102, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
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