Framing and cooperation in public good games: an experiment with an interior solution
AbstractWe show that experimental subjects tend to contribute more to the public good if they perceive the actions of the others as a source of positive externality rather than a source of negative externality. In our experiment partial contribution to the public good is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium for the repeated game.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 65 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Other versions of this item:
- Marc WILLINGER & Anthony ZIEGELMEYER, 1999. "Framing and cooperation in public good games: an experiment with an interior solution," Working Papers of BETA 9901, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Abbink, Klaus & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 1995. "RatImage - research Assistance Toolbox for Computer-Aided Human Behavior Experiments," Discussion Paper Serie B 325, University of Bonn, Germany.
- James Andreoni, 1994.
"Warm-Glow versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments,"
- Andreoni, James, 1995. "Warm-Glow versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(1), pages 1-21, February.
- Andreoni, J., 1994. "Warm-Glow Versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative Farming on Cooperation in Experiments," Working papers 9406, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- James Andreoni, 1997. "Warm-glow versus cold-prickle: the effect of positive and negative framing on cooperation in experiments," Levine's Working Paper Archive 671, David K. Levine.
- Keser, Claudia, 1996. "Voluntary contributions to a public good when partial contribution is a dominant strategy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 359-366, March.
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