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Cooperation and framing effects in provision point mechanisms: Experimental evidence

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  • Bougherara, Douadia
  • Denant-Boemont, Laurent
  • Masclet, David

Abstract

Andreoni (1995) showed that pure framing effects may influence contribution in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms (VCM) by comparing a standard public goods game, called the positive frame condition (giving to the public good), with a negative frame condition (taking from the public good) where the subjects' choice to purchase a private good makes the other subjects worse off. This paper aims at testing the robustness of such framing effects in the context of Provision Point Mechanisms (PPM). Our approach is original in that it combines both framing and provision point dimensions by comparing maintaining (taking from the public good) and creating (giving to the public good) contexts using Provision Point experiments. Consistent with previous findings, we find that individuals tend to be less cooperative in the maintaining frame than in the creating frame. Our results also show that the framing effects are stronger under a PPM than under a VCM and increase with the provision point level. These results may have important consequences for the management of environmental resources.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Ecological Economics.

Volume (Year): 70 (2011)
Issue (Month): 6 (April)
Pages: 1200-1210

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:70:y:2011:i:6:p:1200-1210

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolecon

Related research

Keywords: Public goods experiment Provision point Framing effects;

References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Bouma, Jetske & Ansink, Erik, 2013. "The role of legitimacy perceptions in self-restricted resource use: A framed field experiment," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 84-93.
  2. Bouma, Jetske A. & Joy, K.J. & Paranjape, Suhas & Ansink, Erik, 2014. "The Influence of Legitimacy Perceptions on Cooperation – A Framed Field Experiment," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 127-137.
  3. Bouma, Jetske A. & Joy, K.J. & Paranjape, Suhas & Ansink, Erik, 2013. "Legitimacy and cooperation: A framed field experiment," MPRA Paper 44295, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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