A Class of Fair Distribution Rules a la Rawls and Sen

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A Class of Fair Distribution Rules a la Rawls and Sen

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Reiko Gotoh
Naoki Yoshihara

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Naoki Yoshihara

Abstract

This paper discusses and develops "non-welfare" arguments on distributive justice a la J.Rawls and A.K. Sen, and formalizes, in co-operative production economies, "non-welfaristic" distribution rules as game form types of resource allocation schemes. First, it conceptualizes the Needs Principle which the distribution rule taking individuals' needs into account should satisfy. Second, one class of distribution rules which satisfy the Needs Principle, a class of J-based Capability Maximin Rules, is proposed. Third, axiomatic characterizations of the class of J-based Capability Maximin Rules is provided.

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Paper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number a389.

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Date of creation: Feb 2000
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Handle: RePEc:hit:hituec:a389

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Article
- Reiko Gotoh & Naoki Yoshihara, 2003. "A class of fair distribution rules à la Rawls and Sen," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 63-88, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
I31 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - General Welfare

Cited by:
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Yongsheng Xu & Naoki Yoshihara, 2006. "Axiomatic bargaining theory on opportunity assignments," Discussion Paper Series a473, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
Reiko Gotoh & Kotaro Suzumura & Naoki Yoshihara, 2004. "Extended Social Ordering Functions for Rationalizing Fair Game Forms à la Rawls and Sen," Discussion Paper Series a455, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]

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