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Bank supervision Russian style: Evidence of conflicts between micro- and macroprudential concerns

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Author Info
Claeys, Sophie () (Research Department, Central Bank of Sweden)
Schoors, Koen () (CERISE)

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Abstract

Supervisors sometimes have to manage both the micro- and macro- prudential dimensions of bank stability. These may either conflict or complement each other. We analyze prudential supervision by the Central Bank of Russia (CBR). We find evidence of micro-prudential concerns, measured as the rule-based enforcement of bank standards. Macro-prudential concerns are also documented: Banks in concentrated bank markets, large banks, money center banks and large deposit banks are less likely to face license withdrawal. Further, the CBR is reluctant to withdraw licenses when there are “too many banks to fail”. Finally, macro-prudential concerns induce regulatory forbearance, revealing conflicts with micro-prudential objectives.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden) in its series Working Paper Series with number 205.

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Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: 01 Mar 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:rbnkwp:0205

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Postal: Sveriges Riksbank, SE-103 37 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: 08 - 787 00 00
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Related research
Keywords: Prudential Supervision Bank Stability Systemic Stability

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
N20 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - General, International, or Comparative

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