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Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations, and Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank

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Author Info
Freixas, Xavier
Parigi, Bruno M
Rochet, Jean-Charles

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Abstract

We model systemic risk in an interbank market. Banks face liquidity needs as consumers are uncertain about where they need to consume. Interbank credit lines allow to cope with these liquidity shocks while reducing the cost of maintaining reserves. However, the interbank market exposes the system to a coordination failure (gridlock equilibrium) even if all banks are solvent. When one bank is insolvent, the stability of the banking system is affected in various ways depending on the patterns of payments across locations. We investigate the ability of the banking system to withstand the insolvency of one bank and whether the closure of one bank generates a chain reaction on the rest of the system. We analyze the coordinating role of the central bank in preventing payments systemic repercussions and we examine the justification of the too-big-to-fail policy.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.

Volume (Year): 32 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 611-38
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Handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:32:y:2000:i:3:p:611-38

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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-2879

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1999. "Financial Contagion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2092, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Peter M. Garber, 1998. "Notes on the Role of TARGET in a Stage III Crisis," NBER Working Papers 6619, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Townsend, Robert M, 1987. "Economic Organization with Limited Communication," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 954-71, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Steven C. Salop, 1979. "Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 141-156, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Freeman, Scott, 1996. "Clearinghouse banks and banknote over-issue," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 101-115, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 1996. "Interbank lending and systemic risk," Proceedings, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), pages 733-765.
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  7. Nobuhiro Kiyotaki & John Moore, 2004. "Credit Chains," ESE Discussion Papers 118, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  8. Freeman, Scott, 1996. "The Payments System, Liquidity, and Rediscounting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1126-38, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1976. "Optimal Financial Crises," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 97-01, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Calomiris, Charles W & Kahn, Charles M, 1991. "The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 497-513, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Jacklin, Charles J & Bhattacharya, Sudipto, 1988. "Distinguishing Panics and Information-Based Bank Runs: Welfare and Policy Implications," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(3), pages 568-92, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Brimmer, Andrew F, 1989. "Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: Central Banking and Systemic Risks in Capital Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 3-16, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Flannery, Mark J, 1996. "Financial Crises, Payment System Problems, and Discount Window Lending," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 28(4), pages 804-24, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Fulghieri, Paolo, 1994. "Uncertain liquidity and interbank contracting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 287-294. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. de Bandt, Olivier & Hartmann, Philipp, 2000. "Systemic Risk: A Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 2634, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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